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A. Introduction: The Multi-Actor (Investment) Contracts Opportunity 
 
“The most important way we improve regulation, according to the responsive 
approach, is by conceiving of regulatory culture not as a rulebook but as a storybook 
and helping one another to get better at sharing instructive stories.”1 
 
 
The regulation of foreign direct investment (FDI) is addressed in both domestic and 
international law. Most of the regulation of FDI occurs in the domestic sphere while 
the international realm often dictates the scope of impacts that domestic regulatory 
initiatives may have on foreign investors. Customary international law and 
investment treaties recognize the ability of states to regulate foreign investment, but 
discriminatory regulation or regulation that violates international laws on investment 
protection is proscribed.2 Interactions between domestic regulation and international 
protection of foreign investment are relevant to all countries. However, for Third 
World countries, there is the added question of whether and how foreign investment 
contributes to economic development. 3 As a result, the relationship between the 
regulation of foreign investment and economic development, particularly in the 
Third World context, is an oft-debated issue.4  
∗ LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D. Assistant Professor, College of Law, University of Saskatchewan. Thanks to the 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) for funding for this project. An earlier 
version of this article was presented at the International Research Collaborative on “Financial and Climate 
Crises: Global Regulatory Responses” organized at Law and Society Association’s Annual Conference in 
2012. Thanks to Kyla Tienhaara and Fiona Haines for comments on an earlier draft of this article and to 
anonymous reviewers for their comments. 
1 John Braithwaite, “The Essence of Responsive Regulation” (2011) 44 UBC L Rev 475 at 520 
[Braithwaite, “Essence”]. 
2 See generally, Surya P Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle, 2d ed ( 
Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2012); Jeswald W Salacuse, The Three Laws of International Investment: 
National, Contractual and International Frameworks for Foreign Capital (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013); Todd Weiler, The Interpretation of International Investment Law: Equality, Discrimination, 
and Minimum Standards of Treatment in Historical Context (Leiden, Nethl: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2013). On foreign investment regulation in Canada, see Russell Diegan, Investing in Canada: The Pursuit 
and Regulation of Foreign Investment (Scarborough: Thomson Profession, 1991); Navin Joneja, 
Regulation of Foreign Investment in Canada – The Investment Canada Act: Law, Policy and Practice 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2014). 
3 See Ibironke T Odumosu, “The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the Third World” 
(2007) 8:2 San Diego Int’l LJ 345. 
4 See Ha-Joon Chang, “Regulation of Foreign Investment in Historical Perspective” (2004) 16 Eur J of 
Devp Research 687; Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical 
Perspective (London, UK: Anthem, 2002). Professor Chang’s historical survey of the regulation of foreign 
investment suggests that countries move in the direction of further liberalization and non-discrimination in 
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 Beyond the debates about the economic implications of foreign investment 
regulation, the relationship between foreign investment and other subjects that 
impact the public-interest generate significant discussion. 5  Presented here is an 
analysis of the regulation of the sometimes competing aims presented by foreign 
investors, governments, and local communities in the extractive industries. These 
aims sometimes overlap, depend on particular contexts, and are difficult to present in 
profit, economic growth and development, ecological sustainability, and social 
wellbeing categories. Rather, they ebb and flow; the goals fluctuate based on the 
particular situation, time, and place of the actors involved. The interests are not 
static; for example, local communities are not always concerned about environmental 
integrity. Environmental goals are more often the concern of local communities 
where pollution impacts the health of these communities, impedes their ability to 
farm, fish, or earn other livelihood, and generally creates communities that are 
uninhabitable.6 Like other actors, some of these communities are also interested in 
the economic contributions of FDI. But their interests transcend this single focus. 
Therefore, the focus here on the often competing economic and environmental 
integrity goals generated by extractive industry projects is presented with an 
understanding that these goals are not static.7 
 
 
 Management of the risks generated from these competing areas is mainly 
addressed at the domestic level. Adopting insights from both proponents and critics 
of responsive regulation as well as scholarship on regulatory contracts, this article 
draws lessons from Canadian experience with regulation and contracts in extractive 
industries.8 These Canadian contracts have different combinations of actors – state-
investor, investor-local communities, and sometimes, state-local communities-
investor. Ongoing study of these contract formations lend credence to the suggestion 
that contracts could reduce conflict and foster more amicable relationships between 
their foreign investment systems as an outcome of economic development and not necessarily as a cause 
of economic development. 
5 There have been analyses of the relationship between foreign investment and several areas relevant to the 
public interest. See for example, Valentina Vadi, Public Health in International Investment Law and 
Arbitration (Abingdon, UK; New York: Routledge, 2013); Lorenzo Cotula, Human Rights, Natural 
Resource and Investment Law in a Globalised World: Shades of Grey in the Shadow of the Law (London; 
New York: Routledge, 2012). 
6 For a description of some of the relevant environmental challenges, see Rhuks Temitope Ako, 
Environmental Justice in Developing Countries: Perspectives from Africa and Asia-Pacific (London, UK; 
New York: Routledge, 2013) [Ako, Environmental Justice]. 
7 Scholars, governments and other policy makers have recognized the intersection between foreign 
investment and the environment. See generally, Jorge E Vinuales, Foreign Investment and the 
Environment in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Kyla Tienhaara, The 
Expropriation of Environmental Governance: Protecting Foreign Investors at the Expense of Public 
Policy (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
8 On responsive regulation, see generally, Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: 
Transcending the Deregulation Debate (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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the actors involved in investment projects in extractive industries.9 However, some 
of these contract formations are not particularly beneficial to local communities. 
Using regulatory examples from different parts of the world, including recent 
initiatives in resource-rich Nigeria, it is suggested here that a multi-actor approach to 
investment-related contracts in the extractive industries could have (quasi) regulatory 
implications for managing competing goals.  
 
 
 The proposed multi-actor approach developing through ongoing research on 
decision-making in the extractive industry advocates for the adoption of multi-actor 
(investment) agreements. These are contracts among foreign investors who are 
involved in project development, local communities that host or are impacted by 
particular investment projects, and the host Government(s).10 This article is part of a 
series that investigates the potential contributions of a robust contract framework for 
addressing some of the challenges that the relationship between local communities, 
foreign investors, and governments present.11 The multi-actor contract framework is 
imagined as a framework that only involves these three actors because these actors 
are immediately and often most directly impacted by the effects of foreign 
investment projects in the extractive industries. It is a tripartite framework that 
directly incorporates the interests and perspectives of these actors. However, the 
framework recognizes the need to regulate in the broader public interest, hence the 
involvement of the Government that sits at the negotiating table on the public’s 
behalf. 
 
 
 Host governments have immense legal and regulatory capacity and power to 
determine the legal and economic structures of the projects, and indeed, of the entire 
jurisdiction that they govern. They also have the responsibility to ensure that the 
broader public interest is captured in whichever contractual and/or regulatory tools 
they adopt. Investors provide significant amounts of capital and expertise, and they 
physically implement projects in local communities. These investors are in constant, 
close contact with the host and impacted local communities. For their part, the local 
communities are inhabitants of the territories in which projects are implemented. 
Even though the entire country could potentially benefit from these projects, host and 
impacted communities directly bear the consequences of these projects, whether 
positive or negative. Their real property and other legal rights are implicated in 
9 See Ibironke T Odumosu-Ayanu, “Governments, Investors and Local Communities: Analysis of a Multi-
Actor Investment Agreement Framework” (on file with author) [Odumosu-Ayanu, “Multi-Actor 
Investment Agreement Framework”]. 
10 For a detailed discussion of the multi-actor agreements framework, see Odumosu-Ayanu, “Multi-Actor 
Investment Agreement Framework”, ibid. 
11 For a chronicle of the ongoing research, see Odumosu-Ayanu, “Multi-Actor Investment Agreement 
Framework”, ibid; Ibironke T Odumosu-Ayanu, “Foreign Direct Investment Catalysts in West Africa: 
Interactions with Local Content Laws and Industry-Community Agreements” (2012) 35 NC Centr L Rev 
65; Ibironke T Odumosu-Ayanu, “Land, Niger Delta Peoples and Oil and Gas Decision-Making” (on file 
with author) [Odumosu-Ayanu, “Oil and Gas Decision-Making”]. 
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engaging with investors and governments with regards to extractive industry 
projects. These communities have moral entitlements as well as economic interests 
that are directly impacted by extractive industry projects.12 
 
 
 The proposed multi-actor approach finds support in some contract 
approaches to regulation. 13  However, it transcends these existing perspectives. 
Rather than purport to be primarily a regulatory tool, it is argued here that multi-
actor contracts could serve quasi-regulatory functions by providing support for 
regulatory initiatives. This support could, nevertheless, be determinative of the 
regulatory choices that governments make. The contracts would actively include 
affected communities that would act as parties having privity to ensure that both the 
government and investors fulfill their terms of the contracts. To the extent that these 
contracts include concrete obligations for the state and investors, they would serve a 
quasi-regulatory role.14  
 
 
 The present article does not fully articulate the scope, contributions and 
challenges of the multi-actor approach. The scope of the approach, the specific 
questions that need to be addressed and the need for further research have been 
explored in other work.15 Here, the focus is on the (quasi) regulatory scope of the 
approach. There are several reasons that compel adoption of this contract approach 
which has potential quasi-regulatory capacities. Foreign investment law has typically 
focused on states and foreign investors without directing much specific attention to 
affected local communities. Local community interests are addressed in other areas 
such as environmental law and human rights law, which while important, may not 
necessarily address all of a community’s concerns. Evidently, there is a need to 
question the emphasis placed on this state/investor-centric approach to foreign 
investment. In addition, states sometimes fail to adequately represent their 
constituents due to lack of capacity, lack of interest, and even conflict of interest in 
some cases. As a result, international law sometimes extends standing to non-state 
actors, including to investors in the international law on foreign investment and to 
individuals in human rights law.  
 
 
 Given the inherent limitations in states’ regulation, direct local community 
participation has the potential to foster robust decision-making and enhance 
regulatory initiatives. Recognition of the contributions of local community 
participation partly accounts for the conclusion of Community Development 
12 Odumosu-Ayanu, “Multi-Actor Investment Agreement Framework”, ibid. 
13 See the discussion in part D of this article. 
14 Odumosu-Ayanu, “Multi-Actor Investment Agreement Framework” supra note 9. 
15 For a detailed discussion of the challenges and questions for further research, see Odumosu-Ayanu, 
“Multi-Actor Investment Agreement Framework”, ibid. 
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Agreements (CDAs) between investors and local communities in many parts of the 
world, and the conclusion of agreements between Governments and local 
communities.16 For example, the Government of British Columbia has concluded 
Economic and Community Development Agreements with some indigenous nations 
in the Province of British Columbia.17 References here to CDAs and other existing 
contract forms do not necessarily suggest an endorsement of these agreement forms, 
their contents, or their processes. As discussed in Part D, they are only addressed 
here as examples of existing agreements that incorporate local communities. While 
many of the investor-local community CDAs and even the British Columbia 
Economic and Community Development Agreements are mostly revenue-related 
agreements, the proposed multi-actor agreements are conceived of as more robust 
agreements that could make some regulatory contributions, especially with regard to 
balancing competing regulatory goals. 
 
 
 Investment in the extractive industries typically involves competing goals. 
For example, the goal of obtaining economic benefit from foreign investment must 
be balanced with the goal of minimizing the negative environmental impacts of 
investment projects. As argued here, there is sometimes a focus on the economic 
benefits of projects to the detriment of other factors such as the (immediate) impacts 
of environmental degradation on local communities. More direct participation of 
local communities presents an opportunity to better understand the views and 
interests of these communities, to take these views and interests seriously in 
regulation, and also to provide direct recourse to dispute settlement mechanisms that 
may otherwise be unavailable. 
 
 
 While it is not envisaged that multi-actor contracts would only apply to 
foreign project proponents and not to their local counterparts, it is necessary to 
understand this approach within the context of foreign investment for at least two 
reasons. First, and especially for Third World countries, many investors in the 
extractive industries are foreign investors. Second, given the conflict that sometimes 
16 See Odumosu-Ayanu, “Multi-Actor Investment Agreement Framework”, ibid. 
17 See Economic and Community Development Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen in Right of 
British Columbia and Stk’emlúpsemc of the Secwepemc Nation, August 24, 2010; Economic and 
Community Development Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen in Right of British Columbia and 
the McLeod Lake Indian Band, August 25, 2010; Economic and Community Development Agreement 
between Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia and Nak’azdli First Nation, 
June 12, 2012; Economic and Community Development Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen in 
Right of the Province of British Columbia and the Ktunaxa Nation Council Society, January 29, 2013; 
Economic and Community Development Agreement between Lower Similkameen Indian Band & Upper 
Similkameen Indian Band and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia, 
March 28, 2013; Economic and Community Development Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen in 
Right of the Province of British Columbia and William Lake Indian Band, March 6, 2013; Economic and 
Community Development Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British 
Columbia and Soda Creek Indian Band, March 5, 2013; online: 
<http://www.newrelationship.gov.bc.ca/agreements_and_leg/economic.html> . 
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exists between the regulation of foreign investment and international investment law, 
it is necessary to consider the location of these proposed multi-actor contracts in the 
regulation of foreign investment. The negotiated multi-actor contracts may better 
position states within the investment protection mandate that international 
investment law places on them. It is unlikely that quasi-regulatory initiatives 
included in these agreements could be deemed discriminatory under international 
investment law, as investors would participate in negotiations and work out terms 
from their perspective. Balancing investment protection with regulation in the public 
interest are sometimes competing goals that require carefully crafted solutions, some 
of which are located in the realm of negotiated contracts. 
 
 
 In response to the competing goals engendered by investment projects, it is 
necessary to include host and impacted local communities in the decision-making 
process. Such involvement would impact regulation and contribute to more robust 
regulatory decision-making and enforcement because regulators would be forced to 
consider competing goals that they may otherwise not adequately consider in the 
absence of the direct involvement of these communities. The quasi-regulatory 
contributions of the proposed multi-actor investment agreement regime is supported 
by literature on the participation of citizens in investment decision-making, and by 
alternative regulatory practices that incorporate local communities in regulatory 
decision-making. 18 
 
 
 Part B analyzes the regulation of foreign investment within the context of 
international law. It focuses on the discipline that the international investment law 
regime places on foreign investment regulation and the potential contributions of a 
multi-actor contract approach to investment relationships. Part C draws examples 
from Nigeria’s recent regulatory responses to economic and environmental goals. 
The Nigerian experience illustrates that its government is more apt to respond to 
financial challenges than it is to respond to long-standing environmental concerns 
that have significant and even immediate impacts on the communities that either host 
or are impacted by the exploitation of oil and gas. Part D presents a detailed analysis 
of contract and tripartite approaches to regulation, drawing support from the 
literature for a local community-involved foreign investment regime in the extractive 
industries. It also analyzes the potential challenges of a multi-actor contract 
approach, concluding that its potential contributions outweigh the challenges if 
properly managed. In concluding the article, part E outlines the potential 
contributions of the multi-actor approach to foreign investment regulation and the 
management of competing goals. 
 
 
18 On public participation in extractive industries, see generally, Donald M. Zillman, Alastair Lucas & 
George (Rock) Pring, Human Rights in Natural Resource Development: Public Participation in the 
Sustainable Development of Mining and Energy Resources (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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B. Foreign Investment Regulation and the International Law on Foreign 
Investment 
 
A strong economy is essential for the wellbeing of countries and citizens in a 
globalized 21st century. To the extent that FDI contributes to economic growth and 
development, governments focus significant attention on the promotion of these 
investments. 19  As much as possible, governments seek to stay in a position of 
economic significance. The African Development Bank notes that in 2009, 27 
million people were added to the ranks of poor people in Africa. 20 The global 
financial crisis of 2008-921 has been identified as a major cause of the rise in the 
number of poor people in Africa leading to a socio-economic crisis for some. Even 
though the number of affected people are discussed based on general averages, the 
stories and impacts are local. Regulatory responses must also be specific and local.  
 
 
 For over two decades African countries have turned to FDI to provide 
foreign capital for economic growth. 22 These countries attract FDI by providing 
generous assurances, protective measures, and incentives to foreign investors in 
order to encourage the investors to invest in their countries. The race to attract 
foreign investment is not often accompanied by dedicated regulatory initiatives to 
ensure that the benefits of foreign investment are well-harnessed and that non-
beneficial impacts of foreign investment are kept to a minimum. Reductions in 
foreign investment mean that the competition to attract investors and much-needed 
foreign capital intensifies; policies to prioritize the economy above other concerns 
become common place. Meanwhile, foreign investment regulation involves a 
19 For the debate on the relationship between foreign investment flows and economic growth, see 
generally, Xiaoying Li & Xiaming Liu, “Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: An 
Increasingly Endogenous Relationship” (2004) 33 World Dev 393; Marta Bengoa & Blanca Sanchez-
Robles, “Foreign Direct Investment, Economic Freedom and Growth: New Evidence from Latin America” 
(2003) 19 Eur J Pol Economy 529; Magnus Blomstrom, Robert Lipsey & Mario Zejan, “Is Fixed 
Investment the Key to Economic Growth?” (1996) 111 QJ Econ. 269; J. Benson Durham, “Absorptive 
Capacity and the Effects of Foreign Direct Investment and Equity Foreign Portfolio Investment on 
Economic Growth” (2004) 48 Eur Econ Rev 285. See also Theodore H. Moran, Edward M. Graham & 
Magnus Blostrom eds, Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development (Washington, D.C.: 
Institute for International Economics, 2005); Yingqi Annie Wei & VN Balasubramanyam eds, Foreign 
Direct Investment: Six Country Case Studies (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward 
Elgar, 2004). 
20 African Development Bank Group, “Africa and the Global Economic Crisis: Strategies for Preserving 
the Foundations of Long Term Growth” (Working Paper No, 98, July 2009), online: African Development 
Bank Group 
<http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/WORKING%2098.pdf >  at 9. 
21 The dates of the recent global financial crisis could vary depending on when one thinks it commenced – 
2007 or 2008 – and also whether everyone would agree that the crisis has come to an end. As a result, in 
referring to post-crisis responses in this article, I recognize that it is arguable that the crisis is ongoing in 
some places and has not become an occurrence of the past. 
22 See generally, Ibironke T Odumosu-Ayanu, “South-South Investment Treaties, Transnational Capital 
and African Peoples” (2013) 21 Afr J Int’l& Comp L 172 [Odumosu-Ayanu, “South-South Investment 
Treaties”]. 
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complex network of regulatory frameworks.23 International and domestic regulatory 
regimes co-exist, and the approaches to regulation range from liberal to regulatory 
state approaches. Domestic regulation is greatly influenced by international rules that 
favour liberalization and minimal state intervention. Yet competing economic, 
social, and environmental issues also inform domestic regulation. Sound regulatory 
practices are required to reconcile concerns of competing jurisdictions and 
approaches. 
 
 
 Regulation of foreign investment presents both opportunities and risks, 
particularly for African countries that seek to foster their economic positions. First, 
there is the risk that overregulation of foreign investment, in order to address 
concerns such as environmental sustainability, will discourage foreign investment. 
Second, there is a risk that adoption of regulation that breaches international 
commitments to foreign investors will attract sanctions from international arbitral 
tribunals which could bring the possibility of millions of dollars payable in damages. 
Third, there is a risk of under-regulation resulting in the failure to mitigate 
contributions to anthropogenic climate change and other environmental concerns. 
 
 
 International investment law disciplines and could sometimes restrain 
domestic government regulation of foreign investment despite the argument that 
“‘[g]ood’ regulation is back in fashion.”24 As Professor Haines notes, literature on 
regulation has oscillated between governance/instrumental approaches to regulation, 
deregulation, and emphasis on a strong role for the regulatory state and the law.25 
However since “the 2008-9 economic crisis the emphasis is once again on better 
regulation, not deregulation. Deregulation is a bad word. Getting rid of regulation 
without reconstructing better, more effective, regulation is part of the problem.”26 
While deregulation may be a “bad word” in some parts of the world, it continues to 
have currency in parts of Africa. Authors argue that the quality of regulation could 
contribute to financial crises or the mitigation of crises’ effects. Of course, regulation 
also has a significant impact on other socio-economic issues and environmental 
integrity. Jeffrey Friedman argues that the recent financial crisis was a result of 
23 See Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, “Mutations of Neo-liberalism in International Investment Law” 
(2011) 3 Trade L & Dev 203. 
24 Fiona Haines, The Paradox of Regulation: What Regulation can Achieve and what it Cannot 
(Cheltenham, UK; Northampton MA, United States: Edward Elgar, 2011) 14 [Haines, Paradox of 
Regulation]. 
25 Ibid. at 10-14. 
26 Ibid. at 14. A Better Regulation for Growth paper notes that “[d]eregulation and “regulatory relief” were 
the key principles of the 1980s, often coupled with privatization, based partly on the “small government” 
ideology, but more often on a growing body of applied microeconomics about the costs and benefits of 
regulation. This phase was a natural reaction to the rapid growth of regulation in an era when the market 
impacts of regulation were simply not recognized.” Scott Jacobs and Peter Ladegaard for the Better 
Regulation for Growth Program, Regulatory Governance in Developing Countries (Washington, DC: 
International Finance Corporation, 2010) at 5. 
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regulations that constrain modern capitalism27 while Joseph Stiglitz takes the view 
that those activities that went unrestrained by “good regulation” contributed to the 
financial crisis.28 Yet others like Balleisen offer a nuanced view of the origin of the 
recent global financial crisis.29  
 
 
 Regardless of its cause(s), it is clear that the impacts of the recent global 
crisis were immediately visible. Governments’ focus on the economy may be seen as 
the result of the immediate visibility of the results of economic downturns. At the 
beginning of the crisis, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) reported that global FDI declined by more than 20 per cent in 2008 due 
to the global financial crisis.30 Although Third World countries were not seriously 
affected at the initial stages of the crisis, all countries were urged to “resist the 
temptation of protectionism” and respond by creating favourable conditions for the 
recovery of FDI flows and economic growth.31 As UNCTAD predicted, FDI inflows 
into Africa fell by 36 percent in 2009.32 While recovery had started on a global level, 
the decline continued in Africa in 201033 and 2011.34 The decline resounded in 
Nigeria and other African countries.  
27 Jeffrey Friedman, “A Crisis of Politics, Not Economics: Complexity, Ignorance, and Policy Failure” 
(2009) 21 Critical Rev127, online: http://www.criticalreview.com/crf/pdfs/Friedman_intro21_23.pdf. 
28 Joseph Stiglitz, “The Anatomy of a Murder: Who Killed America’s Economy?” (2009) 21 Critical Rev, 
online: <http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2009-1020-Stiglitz-article.pdf>. 
Professor Stiglitz notes that, “this is a crisis of our economic and political system. Each of the players was, 
to a large extent, doing what they thought they should do. The bankers were maximizing their incomes, 
given the rules of the game. The rules of the game said that they should use their political influence to get 
regulations and regulators that allowed them, and the corporations they headed, to walk away with as 
much money as they could.” 
29 Edward Balleisen, “The Global Financial Crisis and Responsive Regulation: Some Avenues for 
Historical Inquiry” (2011) 44 UBC L Rev 557 at 563 expresses the view that regulatory failures offer only 
a partial account of the origin of the crisis. 
30 UNCTAD Investment Brief, Number 1, 2009, online: UNCTAD, 
<http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20095_en.pdf>. 
31 Ibid. 
32 United Nations: Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, FDI in Africa – Policy Brief No. 4, October 
2010. 
33 UNCTAD Global Investment Trends Monitor, “Global and Regional FDI Trends in 2010” (No. 5, 17 
January 2011) at  4 notes as follows: “Inflows to Africa, which peaked in 2008 driven by the resource 
boom, appear to continue the downward trend of the previous year. For the region as a whole, UNCTAD 
estimates show that FDI inflows fell by 14% to $50 billion in 2010, although there are significant regional 
variations. While the downward trends of inflows to North Africa appear to have stabilized, in sub-
Saharan Africa, inflows to South Africa declined to barely a quarter of the 2009 level, contributing to the 
large fall of FDI inflows in the subregion.” 
34 UNCTAD Global Investment Trends Monitor, “Global Flows of Foreign Direct Investment Exceeding 
Pre-Crisis Levels in 2011 Despite Turmoil in the Global Economy” (No. 8, 24 January 2012) at 1 notes 
that: “Africa, the region with the most least developed countries (LDCs), continued its decline in FDI 
inflows.” 
                                                          
278 UNB LJ     RD UN-B                           [VOL/TOME 65] 
 
 
 Even though economic downturns typically have immediate impacts 
compared to some environmental challenges whose impacts may linger for decades 
before becoming visible, initially, the global crisis did not have a significantly 
negative impact on African countries because their financial markets were not as 
integrated with global markets as were markets elsewhere. This held true in the case 
of Nigeria. Subsequent experience however demonstrated otherwise.35 In Nigeria, 
foreign investors began to disinvest and repatriate capital and dividends, and external 
reserves were depleted.36 The global crisis 
 
resulted in [a] decline in oil revenues leading to revenue attrition for all 
tiers of government; reduced capital inflows into the economy; depletion 
of external reserves; demand pressure in the foreign exchange market; 
substantial decline in stock market capitalization and share prices. The 
stock market lost about 70 per cent of its market value in 2008. The price 
collapse within the market resulted in massive wealth destruction, credit 
contraction, impairment of banks, assets liquidation and loss of confidence 
in the global financial markets.37  
 
The crisis presented a situation that is difficult for regulators with limited capacity to 
deal with. Yet, as discussed in part C, the government quickly responded with 
regulatory initiatives. The same is not often the case where the impact is felt mostly 
by local communities in typically marginalized natural resource-rich territories. 
 
 
 With or without a financial or socio-economic crisis, the regulation of 
foreign investment, especially in Third World countries, is a much debated subject. 
Domestic regulation of foreign investment is closely linked with international rules 
on the regulation of these investments. International law generally recognizes the 
rights of states to regulate the activities of economic actors, including foreign 
investors, within their jurisdictions. This recognition is included in some investment 
treaties and other instruments.38 This right, however, is not without limitations. 
 
 
35 The Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria expressed the view that: “Like other African countries, the 
Nigerian economy was initially perceived to have been isolated from the financial crisis. … However, the 
effects began to show by end-March 2008 with the crash in the capital market and some banks having 
expanded their businesses outside the shores of Nigeria, the contagion effect of the crisis hit the Nigerian 
economy.” See Mallam Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, “The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the Nigeria 
Capital Market and the Reforms” (Delivered at the 7th Annual Pearl Awards and Public Lecture, Muson 
Centre, Onikan, Lagos, 27 May2011), online: Pearl Awards 
<http://pearlawardsng.com/uploads/downloads/the_impact_of_the_global_financial_crisis_on_the_nigeria
n_capital_market_and_the_reforms.pdf> at 6 [Sanusi, “Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Nigeria”]. 
36 Ibid at 6-7. 
37 Ibid at 8. 
38 See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Res 3281 (XXIX), art 2(a) (12 December 
1974), UN GAOR, 29th Sess, Supp (No. 31) at 50, UN Doc A/3235.   
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 There are at least two competing stories of the regulation of foreign 
investment on the international level. First, international law is reluctant to impose 
significant enforceable obligations on foreign investors. International law protects 
foreign investment, especially through thousands of bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs). The treaties focus inter alia on means of regulating and minimizing state 
intervention in the activities of foreign investors. Investor obligations are often 
included in voluntary codes, some of which are developed by the international 
community,39 and corporate codes developed by investors themselves as forms of 
self-regulation. A nuanced view of the regulation of foreign investment suggests that 
there is some regulation of foreign investment in international law albeit mostly 
through non-binding instruments.40  
 
 
 Second, the regulation, or lack thereof, of foreign investment in 
international law has significant impacts on domestic regulation of these 
investments. International instruments, especially BITs, include significant 
protection for foreign investment. International investment law regulates state 
interventionism; hence some domestic regulation that impacts foreign investment 
may cause states to incur obligations to pay compensation for interference with 
foreign investment. Argentina, after its financial crisis of 2000 to 2002, is a case in 
point.41 While the protection of foreign investment is a laudable goal, some have 
argued that the provisions of investment treaties may contribute to “regulatory 
chill”.42  
 
 
 It is difficult to make sweeping comments about regulatory chill without a 
dedicated study of specific examples. Nevertheless, several standards included in 
investment treaties have the potential to impact domestic regulation. These include 
the expropriation standard, the fair and equitable treatment standard, umbrella 
clauses, national treatment clauses and the most favoured nation standard. The latter 
two standards, national treatment and most favoured nation treatment, will not be 
discussed further because they mostly require the same standard of treatment granted 
to domestic and other foreign investors respectively. The discussion here focuses on 
regulatory expropriation and umbrella clauses, as they are more likely to impact 
39 See United Nations Global Compact, online: United Nations <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/>; 
UNCTAD, Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, online: 
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/Compendium//en/13%20volume%201.pdf>; OECD, OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, online: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf>. 
40 Sol Picciotto, “Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation of International Business” (2003) 42 Colum J 
Transnt’l L 131. 
41 See for example, William W Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, “Investment Protection in 
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties” (2007-2008) 48 Va J Int’l L 307.   
42 See Alberto R Salazar, “NAFTA Chapter 11, Regulatory Expropriation, and Domestic Counter-
Advertising Law” (2010) 27 Ariz  J Int’l & Comp L 31. 
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domestic regulation aimed at realizing the competing goals of economic 
development and ecological sustainability.43  
 
 
 Commentators recognize that while the regulatory expropriation standard is 
useful as a protection of the interests of foreign investors, “it can constrain the ability 
of host states to adopt and implement regulation in pursuit of sustainable 
development goals.”44 BITs typically include the regulatory expropriation standard. 
These investment treaties attempt to determine when a state may adopt regulatory 
expropriation measures – where the measure is for a public purpose, is non-
discriminatory, and is subject to the payment of compensation.45  
 
 
 One of the major mechanisms that make investment treaties effective is 
international arbitration. Some may argue that the right to regulate should not be 
seriously constrained, if at all, because practice does not necessarily provide large-
scale evidence of regulatory chill. For example, some African states have not had 
any actions initiated against them at forums such as the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) while other African countries have only 
had to defend a few such cases.46 In addition, Canada ratified the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States 
(ICSID Convention) 47  on November 1, 2013 almost half a century after the 
Convention was opened for signature on March 18, 1965.48 This is despite the fact 
that Canada has been a defendant in several investment disputes under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement. 49  The Canadian government’s rationale for 
43 For an introduction to regulatory expropriation, sometimes called creeping expropriation, indirect 
expropriation or measures tantamount to expropriation, see Suzy H Nikiema, “Best Practices: Indirect 
Expropriation”  (International Institute for Sustainable Development: Best Practices Series, March 2012), 
online: www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/best_practice_indirect_expropriation.pdf. 
44 Lorenzo Cotula, “The Regulatory Taking Doctrine” (International Institute for Environment and 
Development Sustainable Markets Investment Briefings: Briefing 3) 1, online: IIED 
<http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17014IIED.pdf >. 
45 See generally, Andrew Newcombe, “The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law” 
(2005) 20 ICSID Rev – FILJ 1; Justin R Marlles, “Public Purpose, Private Losses: Regulatory 
Expropriation and Environmental Regulation in International Investment Law” (2007) 16 J. Transntn’l 
Law & Policy 275. 
46 For a list of ICSID cases, see ICSID, “ICSID Cases”, online: 
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageN
ame=Cases_Home>. 
47 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, 18 
March 1965, (1965) 5 ILM 532, entered into force on 14 October 1966. 
48 ICSID News Release, “Canada Ratifies the ICSID Convention” online: ICSID, 
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageTy
pe=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement138>. 
49 North American Free Trade Agreement, US-Can-Mex, 19 December 1992, (1993) 32 ILM 289. For a 
list of the investment cases filed against the Government of Canada under NAFTA, see Foreign Affairs, 
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ratifying the ICSID Convention is not inward looking; it does not focus on the 
impacts of regulating foreign investment within Canada. Rather it is outward 
looking; it focuses on the protection of Canadian investors abroad. The Minister of 
International Trade noted that the “government is committed to helping protect 
Canadian investments around the world.”50 As a result, “[r]atifying this investment 
treaty is an important step toward further ensuring predictability and stability for 
Canadian investors operating abroad.”51 
 
 
 Notwithstanding the fact that countries like Canada are embracing the 
investment arbitration model, that approach is not uniform. Countries such as 
Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela have withdrawn from the ICSID Convention. 52  
Others such as South Africa are rethinking their BIT regime. 53  Argentina is 
defending scores of investment disputes that have resulted from measures it adopted 
to balance competing goals during its socio-economic crisis at the turn of the 
century.54 Generally, the possibility that actions may be initiated at all may be a 
significant consideration when adopting environmental or other regulation that could 
impact foreign investors.55 This consideration is an even greater concern in the (post) 
global financial crisis era where states are actively courting foreign investment.56 A 
state “might decide not to take action in the public interest if it fears that such 
measures may qualify as indirect expropriation and, as such, require the State to pay 
Trade and Development Canada, “Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada”, online: 
<http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-
diff/gov.aspx?lang=eng>. 
50 Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, “Canada Ratifies Important International Treaty on 
Investment Disputes”, online: <http://www.international.gc.ca/media/comm/news-
communiques/2013/11/01a.aspx?lang=eng>. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Sergey Ripinsky, “Venezuela’s Withdrawal from ICSID: What it Does and Does not Achieve”, 
Investment Treaty News, April 13, 2013, online: <IISD http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/venezuelas-
withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-and-does-not-achieve/>; UNCTAD, “Denunciation of the ICSID 
Convention and BITS: Impacts on Investor-State Claims”, IIA Issues Note No. 2, December 2010, online: 
UNCTAD <unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20106_en.pdf>. 
53 See Odumosu-Ayanu, “South-South Investment Treaties”, supra note 22. 
54 See Ibironke T Odumosu-Ayanu, “International Investment Law and Disasters: Necessity, Peoples and 
the Burden of (Economic) Emergencies” in David Caron, Michael Kelly & Anastasia Telesetsky eds, The 
International Law of Disaster Relief (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 374 (forthcoming). 
55 On regulatory expropriation and environmental regulation, see Thomas Waelde & Abba Kolo, 
“Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law” (2001) 
50 ICLQ 811. 
56 It has been noted that some African states that have adopted significant changes in the laws that affect 
the mining industries in their countries have started to “re-evaluate their policies” in the face of the global 
financial crisis. Peter Leon, “Creeping Expropriation of Mining Investments: An African Perspective” 
(2009) 27 JENRL 598 at 643-44. 
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substantial compensation.”57 Citizens of these states ultimately bear the burdens of 
insufficient regulation of the impacts of FDI. 
 
 
 States often defend cases that involve allegations of regulatory 
expropriation following environmental regulation.58 In Compania del Desarrollo de 
Santa Elena S.A. v Republic of Costa Rica, the tribunal expressed the view that: 
 
While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be 
classified as a taking for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate, the 
fact that the Property was taken for this reason does not affect either the 
nature or the measure of the compensation to be paid for the taking. That 
is, the purpose of protecting the environment for which the Property was 
taken does not alter the legal character for which adequate compensation 
must be paid. The international source of the obligation to protect the 
environment makes no difference. Expropriatory measures – no matter 
how laudable and beneficial to society as a whole – are, in this respect, 
similar to any other expropriatory measures that a state may take in order 
to implement its policies: where property is expropriated, even for 
environmental purposes, whether domestic or international, the state’s 
obligation to pay compensation remains.59 
 
However, it is incomplete to suggest that states are unable to adopt sound 
environmental regulation that stand the test of regulatory expropriation in 
international law.60 Rather, situations where state regulation would be expropriatory 
are not clearly defined, and this remains the case where investment treaties affirm the 
rights of states to regulate (as regulatory expropriation does not prohibit regulation 
per se). 61  Such affirmation, however, has not prevented challenges to state 
regulation. Hence, there remains a potential that rules on regulatory expropriation 
could impact states’ regulatory choices. 
 
 
 Like regulatory expropriation measures, umbrella clauses in investment 
treaties are important in the regulation of foreign investment. Umbrella clauses may 
grant investors the ability to initiate a breach of contract claim before an international 
57 Nikiema, supra note 43 at 2. 
58 Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v Republic of Costa Rica, (ICSID Case No ARB/96/1), 
(2000) 15 ICSID Rev-FILJ 169 [Santa Elena]; Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States (ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1), (2002) 5 ICSID Rep. 209, also reported at (2001) 16 ICSID Rev FILJ 168, 
(2001) 40 ILM 36; Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v United Mexican States, (ICSID Case No 
ARB(AF)/00/2) (2004) 19 ICSID Rev FILJ 158, (2004) 43 ILM 133.      
59 Santa Elena, ibid at 192. 
60 See Methanex Corporation v United States of America, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and 
Merits, 3 August 2005, (2005) 44 ILM 1345. For a critique of the regulatory expropriation aspect of this 
decision, see Marlles, supra note 45 at 291-92.   
61 Nikiema, supra note 43 at 21. 
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arbitral tribunal through the dispute settlement clauses in investment treaties.62 These 
umbrella clauses are useful in a consideration of domestic regulation of competing 
goals because they could allow for the internationalization of contract disputes. 
Professor Crawford identifies four interpretations of applicable umbrella clauses – 
those that operate by virtue of “a shared intent of the parties that any breach of 
contract is a breach of the BIT”, those that arise through contract breaches 
committed while exercising sovereign authority, those that “internationalise 
investment contracts”, and the perspective that umbrella clauses do not convert 
contract claims to treaty claims but “may form the basis for a substantive treaty 
claim.” 63  Essentially, contract claims could become internationalized through 
umbrella clauses.  
 
 
 Domestic contracts also come to the fore in regulation issues where states 
bind themselves through stabilization clauses that can freeze regulation at a 
particular time.64 Through stabilization clauses, states commit to not changing the 
regulatory framework in a manner that could affect the financial stability of 
investment projects for a period of time and also to paying compensation to investors 
if they undertake such regulatory changes.65   
 
 
 Waelde and Kolo express the view that investors are not concerned with 
environmental regulation as such.66 The concern rather is with unexpected changes 
that do not conform to the investor’s calculation, or as arbitral tribunals put it, to 
legitimate expectation. 67  Regulatory regimes that exist prior to investment are 
incorporated as part of the risk assessment of a project’s viability.68 What investors 
really seek with investment protection, according to Waelde and Kolo, is inter alia, 
relative stability for a period of time.69 In Tenicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v 
United Mexican States (Tecmed v. Mexico), the tribunal noted that: 
62; See James Crawford, Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration” (2008) 24 Arb Int’l 351; Anthony 
C Sinclair, “The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment Protection” (2004) 
20 Arb Int’l 411; Jonathan B Potts, “Stabilizing the Role of Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment 
Treaties: Intent, Reliance, and Internationalization” (2011) 51 Va J Int’l L 1005. 
63 Crawford, ibid at 367-68. 
64 Sometimes, these stabilization clauses could be included in legislation. See for example, Nigeria LNG 
(Fiscal Incentives, Guarantees and Assurances) Decree No 39 of 1990 as amended by the Nigeria LNG 
(Fiscal Incentives, Guarantees and Assurances) Decree No 113 of 1993. 
65 See Lorenzo Cotula, “Foreign Investment Contracts” (International Institute for Environment and 
Development Sustainable Markets Investment Briefings: Briefing 4); Lorenzo Cotula, “Regulatory 
Takings, Stabilization Clauses and Sustainable Development” OECD Global Forum on International 
Investment (March 27-28, 2008). 
66 Waelde & Kolo, supra note 55 at 819. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
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The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, 
free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the 
foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and 
regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the 
relevant policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to 
plan its investment and comply with such regulations. Any and all State 
actions conforming to such criteria should relate not only to the guidelines, 
directives or requirements issued, or the resolutions approved thereunder, 
but also to the goals underlying such regulations. The foreign investor also 
expects the host State to act consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking 
any preexisting decisions or permits issued by the State that were relied 
upon by the investor to assume its commitments as well as to plan and 
launch its commercial and business activities. The investor also expects 
the State to use the legal instruments that govern the actions of the 
investor or the investment in conformity with the function usually 
assigned to such instruments, and not to deprive the investor of its 
investment without the required compensation. In fact, failure by the host 
State to comply with such pattern of conduct with respect to the foreign 
investor or its investments affects the investor’s ability to measure the 
treatment and protection awarded by the host State and to determine 
whether the actions of the host State conform to the fair and equitable 
treatment principle.70 
 
Although, at the time of concluding contracts, states may be committed to stabilizing 
regulation over a period of time, such stabilization is often unfeasible following a 
crisis that requires a determinative response. If ever warranted, stabilization clauses 
restrain government regulation of competing goals for they assume that the 
protection of investment trumps other goals that may be pursued. Hence, in addition 
to the international regime on foreign investment, stabilization clauses in foreign 
investment contracts may also constrain the nature of state regulation and the extent 
to which such regulation may introduce changes to the current framework. 
 
 
 Situating the multi-actor contract framework within the international law on 
foreign investment therefore has some implications. First, the preceding discussion 
of investment regulation and international investment law suggests that international 
law does not prohibit regulation of foreign investment. It curtails interventions into 
investment activities that do not comply with international investment law. Such 
curtailing has potentially serious implications for domestic regulation and for local 
communities. Nevertheless, if investors participate in multi-actor contract initiatives 
that have quasi-regulatory impacts or purposes, it may be difficult for investors to 
maintain that these contracts violate investment protection measures under the 
international law on foreign investment. 
 
70 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v United Mexican States, (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2) 
(2004) 19 ICSID Rev FILJ 158; (2004) 43 ILM 133 at para 154. 
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 Second, the discussion demonstrates that there is scope for entertaining 
contract disputes in an investment treaty-centric international investment 
law/arbitration regime. However, the existing contracts that have been the subject of 
investment arbitration are investor-state contracts that have typically been used to 
challenge domestic regulation. Where treaties permit counter-claims, a multi-actor 
contract may serve as a state’s defence to an investment claim that challenges a 
regulatory initiative. So far, the prevalent types of contracts in the investment regime 
have focused on states and investors. In fact at the domestic level, contracts define 
the relationships between states and foreign investors, although in investment 
arbitration facilitated by institutions such as the ICSID, investment treaties are 
prevalent. A more robust approach to contracts, that incorporates investors, states, 
and local communities, may present the much needed regulatory space in an 
investment regime that heavily focuses on select actors to the exclusion of others. 
 
 
 In sum, while states may adopt domestic regulation of FDI, such regulation 
is disciplined by rules of international investment law. Multi-actor contracts may be 
situated within the international investment regime in a manner that challenges some 
of the propositions of this regime, especially its state-investor centric nature, without 
violating dictates of international investment law. Hence these contracts have the 
potential to reconcile the interests of the major actors to a larger extent than is 
currently the case, facilitate amicable relationships among them, manage competing 
goals, and serve quasi-regulatory purposes. In addition, and more importantly, they 
could facilitate new rules on international investment law that account for the interest 
and perspectives of local communities.  
 
 
C. Regulatory Examples from Nigeria’s Oil and Gas Industry 
 
Nigeria is a ‘natural’ choice for this brief study of managing competing goals in 
foreign investment for two reasons. First, it receives a significant inflow of foreign 
investment compared to many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, it 
encourages the exploitation of natural resources and as a result, encounters 
significant environmental challenges. The environmental degradation in Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta is almost legendary.71 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights referred to the pollution and environmental degradation in Ogoniland, part of 
the Niger Delta, as “humanly unacceptable” and described the situation in Ogoniland 
as “deplorable”. 72  This does not, however, mean that there is no regulation of 
71 Some of the challenges that the Niger Delta communities face are outlined in The Social and Economic 
Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria (Communication 155/96) 
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, 27 October 2001, online: ACHPR 
<http://www.achpr.org/communications/decision/155.96/>. 
72 Ibid at para 67.   
                                                          
286 UNB LJ     RD UN-B                           [VOL/TOME 65] 
 
 
environmental pollution in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry.73 Instead, in managing 
competing goals, the economic benefits of foreign investment are the predominant 
focus. The regulatory examples discussed here are drawn from the immediate (post) 
financial crisis era. They demonstrate that while the financial crisis received 
immediate regulatory response, longstanding problems encountered by local 
communities have failed to receive such an immediate and clinical response. The 
examples show that sometimes the problem is not the lack of regulatory capacity but 
the calculations based on interests that powerful stakeholders deem more important. 
 
 
 Regulation of Nigeria’s oil and gas industry, which is the predominant 
extractive industry in the country, relies mostly on what Barton et al refer to as the 
criminal law model of regulation.74 About three decades ago, Barton et al advocated 
a contract approach to the regulation of pollution, contrasting the contract model 
with the criminal model. Thompson and Rueggeberg note that “[t]he idea that the 
law of contract might supplement or replace regulatory action under statutes and 
regulation arose out of a detailed study of the system of environmental regulation in 
Canada.”75 According to Thompson and Rueggeberg, “[i]n a 1980 study … it was 
shown that negotiations and bargaining are major elements of the current regulatory 
practices in Canada, as government and industry strive for consensus as to the effects 
of development projects and as to the technologies that should be used to make these 
effects as beneficial as possible.”76  
 
 
 Barton et al’s contract model is based on statutory authority77 where the 
responsible government branch enters into enforceable contracts with industry actors 
for pollution control.78 According to the authors, significant negotiation on a case by 
case basis already existed at the time of writing providing the impetus for an 
improvement to the prevailing criminal law model.79 They advocated retaining the 
criminal law model for deliberate acts of pollution that were committed with 
impunity. For them, the contract model would work better with “process pollution” 
that is “pollution that is a normal by-product of a desirable human activity.”80 The 
73 See for example, Lawrence Atsegbua, Vincent Akpotaire & Folarin Dimowo, Environmental Law in 
Nigeria: Theory and Practice (Lagos: Ababa Press, 2004). 
74 Barry J Barton, Robert T Franson & Andrew R Thompson, A Contract Model for Pollution Contract 
(Vancouver, Westwater Research Centre, 1984). 
75 Andrew R Thompson & Harriet I Rueggeberg, Contracts in Environmental Management and 
Conservation in the North: Final Report (Vancouver: Fraser Gifford, April 1986) at 1. 
76 Ibid at 1. 
77 Barton et al, supra note 74 at 35-36. 
78 Barton et al refer to “a contract made between the Waste Management Branch and the company as 
willing parties and forming the entire framework for the relationship between them.” Ibid at 27.  
79 Ibid at 23. 
80 Ibid at 27. 
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review of the regulatory mechanisms adopted in Nigeria just before and after the 
global crisis of circa 2008 illustrates a focus on the criminal model. With the limited 
regulatory choices, where economic and other goals compete, the economic goals 
receive more immediate regulatory responses.  
 
 
 Since the onset of the recent global crisis, Nigeria’s government has 
adopted immediate, reactionary regulatory measures. The responses in the financial 
sector have been mainly traditional coercive measures that generate public assurance 
that the government takes the situation seriously. The Central Bank of Nigeria 
replaced the Chief Executives of some banks injected capital into banks, and 
introduced a reform structure that will be integrated into the system over a ten year 
period.81 The Asset Management Company of Nigeria was also created to provide 
liquidity and assist in capitalization of banks that the Central Bank had intervened in; 
a new Corporate Governance Code was drafted; and the International Financial 
Reporting Standards were adopted.82  
 
 
 For Nigeria’s oil and gas industry, the government has not introduced many 
new regulatory mechanisms. This suggests that the regulatory status quo, which is 
not particularly favourable to local communities, is sufficient. There are several 
longstanding statutes on various aspects of the oil and gas industry which are not the 
focus of this discussion, as the focus here is on recently adopted or contemplated 
regulatory changes. Even though these longstanding statutes exist, they do not 
appear, or at least, the enforcement of these statutes does not appear to adequately 
address communities’ concerns. The Land Use Act83 and its impacts on peoples’ land 
rights and environmental justice is an example. 84  Even though Nigeria has an 
Environmental Impact Assessment Act, 85  as Ako notes as recently as 2013, 
environmental impact assessments (EIA) are not effective for public participation 
because “the law is inadequate to ensure active public participation in the EIA 
process as the EIA Act sets a low threshold for project proponents to satisfy with 
regards to the dissemination of environmental information and local involvement in 
the decision-making process.”86 In addition, Ako adopts the view that the “major 
81 Sanusi, “Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Nigeria”, supra note 35 at 8-9. See also Sanusi 
Lamido Sanusi, “Global Financial Crisis Impact in Nigeria, Nigerian Financial Reforms and the Roles of 
the Multilateral Development Banks and IMF” (Submission to the House Financial Services Committee of 
the US Congress Hearing on the Global Financial Crisis, 16 November 2010), online: The Committee on 
Financial Services <http://financialservices.house.gov/Media/file/hearings/111/Sanusi111610.pdf>. 
82 Sanusi, “Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Nigeria”, ibid at 9-11. 
83 Land Use Act, Chapter 202, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. 
84 Rhuks T Ako, “Nigeria’s Land Use Act: An Anti-Thesis to Environmental Justice” (2009) 53 J Afr L 
289. 
85 Environmental Impact Assessment Act, No 86 of 1992, Cap E12, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
2004. 
86 Ako, Environmental Justice, supra note 6 at 32. 
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barrier to justice in environmental matters with relation to the oil industry is the legal 
framework regulating the oil industry.” 87 The question therefore turns to recent 
mechanisms that the government has adopted to address some of these existing 
challenges. While some may argue that there are no significant changes to the oil and 
gas industry that warrant regulatory response, that position is inaccurate because 
there are several challenges in the industry, which versions of a Bill introduced in the 
federal legislature have sought to address. 
 
 
 The Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) was introduced at the National Assembly 
(Nigeria’s federal legislature) in 2007/2008 but it has yet to be passed.88 The impetus 
for an Act that embarks on a substantial reform of the oil and gas industry in Nigeria 
is based on a Report submitted by the Oil and Gas Reform Implementation 
Committee which was established in 2000. 89  The Bill’s long title outlines its 
purpose: to establish “a legal, fiscal and regulatory framework for the petroleum 
industry in Nigeria and for other related matters.” The aim of the PIB is to 
consolidate the regulatory mechanisms related to Nigeria’s petroleum industry. The 
Bill promises some novel regulatory structures for Nigeria’s oil and gas industry but 
according to commentators, “Nigeria’s long-awaited oil law, when it finally comes, 
looks likely to be a botched job that gives favourable tax terms to foreign oil firms 
while doing little to satisfy calls for transparency and reform of a corrupt and 
wasteful sector.”90 It is difficult to tell whether these changes to the Bill are coming 
on the heels of a (post) financial crisis dedication to courting foreign investment, or 
whether they are part of a negotiation or consultation process where investors’ views 
are significantly accounted for. In the absence of enactment of the Bill, the rapidly-
changing nature of its contents, and its wide purview, it suffices to note that the final 
contents of the Bill and its implementation will be a rich source of studies on 
regulatory effectiveness.  
 
 
 Unlike the PIB which has yet to be passed, it is noteworthy that the 
Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act (Local Content Act) was 
enacted in 2010 at a time when the Government was establishing other regulation to 
address the economic crisis. The Act, which was a subject of debate for many years 
87 Ibid. at 38. At page 40, Ako notes that: “The legal framework regulating the oil industry is the major 
barrier to justice with provisions that define offences ambiguously and provide unnecessarily wide 
defences for polluters to avail themselves.” 
88 The Petroleum Industry Bill 2012, online: Nigeria – National Assembly 
<www.nassnig.org/nass2/legislation.php?id=1530> [“PIB”].  
89 Dr Rilwanu Lukman, “Keynote Address by the Honourable Minister of Petroleum Resources on the 
Proposed Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB)” (Keynote Address delivered at Abuja, Nigeria 16 July 2009), 
online: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
<http://www.nnpcgroup.com/Portals/0/pdf/SpeechByHonorableMinisterToIndustry.pdf>. 
90 Joe Brock, “Analysis: Nigeria Oil Bill Waters Down its Reforms”, Reuters Canada (29 May 2012) 
online: Reuters <http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCABRE84S07220120529?sp=true>.  
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before its enactment, was introduced to increase local participation in the oil and gas 
industry. Enacting the Act at this time can be attributed to one of two reasons. First, 
the Act could have been enacted to balance the liberalized foreign investment regime 
with local participation in order to shield the country from external shock generated 
by a global crisis. Second, it is possible that the government decided to enact the Act 
at the time it did regardless of the existence of any global crisis in order to address an 
issue that the country had confronted for years. Regardless of the reasons, the timing 
of the Local Content Act, and its potential contribution to the regulation of the oil 
and gas industry, the Act demonstrates that the government is capable of adopting 
regulatory changes in the oil and gas sector. However, these changes are for the most 
part economically-focused.  
 
 
 Like many regulatory statutes in Nigeria, the Local Content Act created a 
regulatory agency – the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board 
(NCDMB). The NCDMB is charged with implementing the provisions of the Local 
Content Act. The Act adopts a criminal law model of regulation. By section 68 of the 
Local Content Act, violation of the provisions of the Act is an offence punishable by 
a fine or cancellation of the project at issue upon conviction. However, the NCDMB 
has established guidelines that adopt more innovative approaches: providing for a 
multi-disciplinary compliance assurance taskforce 91  and a graduated sanction 
framework that distinguishes non-compliance based on its seriousness as well as 
allowing for notice of non-compliance, notice of demand for compliance, 
withholding approvals, denying participation in subsequent bids, and encouraging 
consultation, mediation, conciliation, expert determination, and arbitration. 92 The 
final step involves prosecution under section 68 of the Local Content Act. The 
regulatory mechanism created is one that encourages compliance and adopts a 
mostly non-confrontational stance in regulating firms that are interested in 
compliance. The impact of the substantial provisions of the Act regarding local 
content is, however, a different matter. It remains to be seen whether the NCDMB 
will follow through with this sophisticated compliance and enforcement framework.  
 
 
 For decades, Nigeria’s regulation of gas flaring has also been an issue of 
major contention.93 Gas flaring implicates issues directly related to investment and 
environmental integrity. The Government has recently returned to the issue of gas 
91 Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board, Procedure for Establishment of a Compliance 
Assurance Taskforce, online: NCDMB <http://www.ncdmb.gov.ng/images/downloads/guidelines/3rd-
PARTY-MONITORING-TASK-FORCE-GUIDELINES.pdf>. 
92 Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board, Proposed Sanctions for Non-Compliance with 
Provisions of the NOGCID Act, online: NCDMB 
<http://www.ncdmb.gov.ng/images/downloads/guidelines/3rd-PARTY-MONITORING-TASK-FORCE-
GUIDELINES-DRAFT-SANCTIONS.pdf>. 
93 See Ibironke T Odumosu, “Transferring Alberta’s Gas Flaring Reduction Regulatory Framework to 
Nigeria: Potentials and Limitations” (2007) 44:4 Alb L Rev 863 [Odumosu, “Gas Flaring”]. 
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flaring. On May 29, 2012, it was reported that the PIB, if passed by Nigeria’s 
legislature, would mandate oil companies to stop the flaring of natural gas by the end 
of 2012.94 The Bill was not passed before the end of 2012. The penalty for failing to 
end gas flaring is the payment of fines or in some cases of failing to lodge a gas flare 
report, three months imprisonment.95 The payment of fines as a regulatory sanction 
for gas flaring has been in place for decades and has not addressed the problem of 
gas flaring in Nigeria. Perhaps, the government believes that the stiffer fines 
proposed, which are expected not to be less than the value of flared or vented natural 
gas, may provide some incentive for compliance. The Bill however, creates an 
exception to this framework. A licensee may flare gas with the permission of the 
Minister in special circumstances.96 The strength of this framework may depend on 
how often the Minister decides to exercise this discretion. Apart from the proposed 
regulatory regime’s fine structure, another potential impediment is the unrealistic 
nature of deadlines established for gas flaring, which is recognized by some 
environmental campaigners. 97  The regulatory approaches to be adopted by 
implementing the prohibition of gas flaring will also be an important study in 
regulatory governance. 
 
 
 Regarding a broader response to environmental challenges in recent times, 
the National Climate Change Commission Bill was introduced in 2008. The Bill has 
been stalled at the Committee Stage.98 While there has been a significant amount of 
debate surrounding the PIB, not much is being said about the National Climate 
Change Commission Bill. In an economy dominated by an industry that significantly 
contributes to the emission of greenhouse gases, relying on traditional regulatory 
responses may be evidence of a naïve faith in the regulatory system. Perhaps, matters 
related to environmental regulation and matters that specifically impact local 
communities require a different form of oversight – significant involvement by local 
communities working within a multi-stakeholder approach.  
 
 
 The adoption of such multi-stakeholder approach might not be too far away 
on the horizon. In recent times, Nigeria’s environmental regulators have 
experimented with a multi-stakeholder approach (although without much emphasis 
on local communities). A National Climate Change Research Support Group (a 
multi-disciplinary group of experts) was created to provide regular technical support 
94 Ejiofor Alike, “Nigeria: PIB to Outlaw Gas Flaring by December”, This Day Newspaper (29 May 
2012).  
95 See PIB, supra note 88 at s 281. 
96 See PIB, ibid at s 277(2). 
97 Alike, supra note 94. 
98 See online: The National Assembly: 
<http://www.nassnig.org/nass2/billspro.php?search=climate+change&Submit=Search>. 
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to the Department of Climate Change at the Federal Ministry of Environment. 99 
While this initiative is laudable, it must be noted that the group does not contribute to 
the enforcement of climate change regulation. Remarkably, the option of public 
participation recognized in Nigeria’s National Policy on the Environment was 
implemented in at least one instance. 100  In 2009, the National Environmental 
Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency and three other Government 
Agencies signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for a renewable two-year 
period with a Traders Association to address the dumping of electronic and electrical 
appliances. Of the 35-member Joint Task Force set up to implement the MoU, 20 
members were from the Traders’ Association. The Task Force was charged with a 
mandate that enables it to conduct inspections and surveillance, investigate, and 
recommend appropriate sanctions for offenders.101  
 
 
 Compared to the adoption of prompt financial regulatory responses 
particularly in banking when the global crisis occurred, major regulatory changes 
that could significantly alter Nigeria’s foreign investment-dominated and somewhat 
crisis-prone oil and gas industry and potentially address competing goals, have not 
entered into force. However, there was at least one major change – the Local Content 
Act – and the regulatory approaches that the NCDMB proposed to adopt. The 
99 Michael Simire, “Climate Change Response: Eggheads to the Rescue” Africa Adaption Programme 
Newsletter 4 (February 2012). 
100 The National Policy on the Environment (1998) s 6.6 notes as follows regarding public participation:  
In order to secure the involvement of the citizenry and assure its commitment to the 
principle of sustainable development, action will be undertaken to enlighten various levels 
of society on the essential linkages between environment and development. Action shall be 
taken to:  
a. ensure public input in the definition of environmental policy objectives;  
b. engage mass and folk media at all levels in the task of public enlightenment;  
c. review curricula at all levels of the educational system to promote the formal study of 
environmental concepts and sciences;  
d. boost environmental awareness and education through the involvement of indigenous 
social structures, voluntary associations and occupational organizations;  
e. secure public confidence in the administration of the environment, by demonstrating the 
resolve of government to enforce the environmental stewardship of government agencies 
and organs, corporate citizens and elite organizations;  
f. grant the citizenry access to environmental information and data thereby promoting the 
quality of environmental management and compliance monitoring;  
g. support the role of cognate NGOs, professional associations and other civic groups in 
activities designed to propagate environmental protection information, techniques and 
concepts. 
101 See “NESREA, CPC, SON Partner Alaba Traders on Sub-Standard Goods”, online: National 
Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency 
<http://www.nesrea.org/publicparticipation.php>. 
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NCDMB looks ready to implement some sophisticated regulatory approaches. These 
initiatives suggest that even though regulatory changes that have the potential to 
affect foreign investment and economic prosperity are slow, they are not impossible. 
Nevertheless, one has to agree that the Local Content Act is highly focused on the 
economy. Also, even though there have not been many recent changes to 
environmental regulation, some recent environmental regulations look ready for the 
participation of local communities. Essentially, the participation of local 
communities in regulatory initiatives is not completely foreign to Nigerian 
regulators. However, as the foregoing analysis demonstrates, regulation that 
competes with economic prosperity is not quickly adopted. Utilizing the public 
participation model recognized in the National Policy on the Environment through 
the adoption of enforceable, multi-actor contracts may be an impetus for adopting 
regulatory approaches that respond to the competing aims on either side of the scale. 
 
 
D. Regulation, Contract and a Multi-Stakeholder Approach 
 
 i. Competing Goals and Regulatory Reform 
 
Regulation, contracts, multi-stakeholder – these three words represent a perspective 
that may be viable for developing regulatory regimes that enhance the effective 
management of competing goals, especially where the regulatory initiatives impact 
foreign investment. 102  As discussed, the international foreign investment regime 
defines regulation that states may adopt mostly as regulation that fosters investment 
protection. To effectively manage competing goals in regulating foreign investment, 
contracts may be apposite. For the most part, existing private contracts are negotiated 
between investors and communities most likely to be affected by risks of investment 
projects.103 These investor-local community contracts are mostly CDAs designed to 
provide funds and services for communities. Contracts between (regulated) firms and 
host communities are not particularly new. In natural resource projects, especially 
where there is an impact on the environment, foreign investors and local 
communities have been known to form environmental contracts that facilitate 
protection of the natural environment.104  
 
 
 These environmental contracts also include contracts between governments 
and investors. Many of these government-investor environmental contracts, 
102 Like most aspects of the economy, foreign investment generates some risk, for example, the risk of 
capital flight in the event that an economic crisis occurs. On the categorization of risk as ideal types – 
actuarial risk, socio-cultural and political risk – see Haines, Paradox of Regulation, supra note 24 
especially at chapter 3.  
103 Natasha Affolder, “Rethinking Environmental Contracting” (2010) 21 J. Envtl L & Prac 155 [Affolder, 
“Environmental Contracting”]. See also Odumosu-Ayanu, “Multi-Actor Investment Agreement 
Framework”, supra note 9. 
104 Affolder, “Environmental Contracting”, ibid. 
                                                          
[2014]                                MULTI-ACTOR CONTRACTS                                      293 
   
 
particularly in European countries and the United States, are voluntary.105 The utility 
of voluntary agreements in the environmental context and the limitations of that 
approach are not addressed here. Rather, enforceable investment-related agreements 
that also have regulatory or quasi-regulatory ramifications for the environment and 
other public interest-impacting areas are discussed here. The contribution of 
contracts to regulation is explored, recognizing that “[r]egulation is a complex social 
interaction”.106 
 
 
 In a discussion of contracts as regulatory instruments, it is important to 
recall that another contract form – contracts between foreign investors and host 
countries – has been adopted for decades, especially in large infrastructure and 
natural resource projects. 107 African countries are familiar with these concession 
contracts but their potential as regulatory instruments has not been fully realized. The 
idea of the regulatory contract 108  as an “implicit” rather than a “formal legal” 
contract has been explored in literature. 109  Stern and Holder are critical of the 
explicit regulatory contract and they argue that it can only “solve the underlying 
problem” if it is “invulnerable to post-contractual opportunism”.110 To them, this 
requires “limits on sovereignty (e.g. extra-territorial appeals and enforcement) that 
governments are only willing to accept in extreme circumstances.”111 As a result, 
they argue that the “problem cannot be “solved”” but only “imperfectly managed.”112 
Explicit contracts, for example, concession contracts, while useful as regulatory 
instruments, have been referred to as “seriously incomplete.”113 As such, Stern and 
Holder advocate for implicit regulatory contracts that have “an independent 
105 See generally, Kurt Deketelaere & Eric W Orts eds, Environmental Contracts: Comparative 
Approaches to Regulatory Innovation in the United States and Europe (London, UK: Kluwer Law 
International, 2001). 
106 Carol Heimer, “Disarticulated Responsiveness: The Theory and Practice of Responsive Regulation in 
Multi-Layered Systems” (2011) 44 UBC L Rev 663. 
107 See Christopher T Curtis, “The Legal Security of Economic Development Agreements” (1988) 29 Harv 
Int’l LJ 317; Timothy B Hansen, “The Legal Effect Given Stabilization Clauses in Economic 
Development Agreements” (1988) 28 Va J Int’l L 1015; James N Hyde, “Economic Development 
Agreements” (1962) 105 Recueil des cours 271. 
108 On regulatory contracts, see generally J Gregory Sidak & Daniel F Spulber, “Deregulatory Takings and 
Breach of the Regulatory Contract” (1996) 7 NYU L Rev 851 (noting at 907 that: “The three components 
of the regulatory contract are entry controls, rate regulation, and utility service obligations.”); Jody 
Freeman, “The Contracting State” (2000) 28 Fla St UL Rev 155. 
109 Jon Stern & Stuart Holder, “Regulatory Governance: Criteria for Assessing the Performance of 
Regulatory Systems: An Application to Infrastructure Industries in the Developing Countries of Asia” 
(1999) 8 Utilities Policy 33 at 39. 
110 Ibid at 38. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid at 39.  
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regulatory agency as the core mediating agency.” 114  They note that “lodging 
concession contracts within a separate regulatory framework is a superior solution to 
trying to use them as a substitute for separate regulation.” 115  The idea of the 
concession contract as a regulatory mechanism is therefore tempered by balancing its 
viability with the oversight of a regulatory agency. 
 
 
 Bakovic et al enunciate a “regulation by contract” perspective that is largely 
tariff-focused and exceeds the concession or licence agreement model.116 Focusing 
on the privatization of electricity distribution, Bakovic et al advocate for a political 
contract, with the principles guiding the regulatory contract included in electricity 
laws of the country. 117  Regulation by contract insists on administration by an 
independent regulator but the contract “substantially limits the regulator’s 
discretion”. 118 For Bakovic et al, the “essence of regulation by contract is pre-
specification, in one or more formal or explicit agreements, of the formulas that 
determine prices that a distribution company is allowed to charge for the electricity it 
sells.”119  
 
 
 Here, a different view of the involvement of contracts in regulation is taken. 
The focus extends beyond tariff setting. Rather the focus is on peoples’ agency in 
fostering a balanced allocation of risk between a focus on economic wellbeing and 
environmental cleanliness (and other social goals), which neither governments nor 
investors may be well placed to articulate in some circumstances. In this articulation 
of multi-actor contracts’ quasi-regulatory functions, the contract envisaged is not a 
concession or other regulatory contract (as it is often perceived) between the 
government and the concessionaire. Rather it is a contract between the investor, the 
government as regulator, and the local communities impacted by investment 
activities, thereby giving the communities concrete, participatory rights to ensure a 
meaningful balance of competing goals. It provides some surveillance over the 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. They further note that: “Explicit contracts can provide a useful underpinning for the implicit 
regulatory understanding while avoiding the dangers of relying too heavily on an incomplete binding 
contract negotiated in circumstances of considerable uncertainty.” Ibid. at 39. 
116 Tonci Bakovic, Bernard Tenenbaum & Fiona Woolf, “Regulation by Contract: A New Way to 
Privatize Electricity Distribution” (The World Bank Group: Energy and Mining Sector Board Discussion 
Paper 7, May 2003) online: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/05/3057553/regulation-
contract-new-way-privatize-electricity-distribution> [Bakovic et al, “Regulation by Contract”]. For a 
critique of the regulatory contract approach, see Tony Prosser, “Regulatory Contracts and Stakeholder 
Regulation” (2005) 76 Ann Public & Coop Econ 35. See also Rui Cunha Marques & Sanford Berg, 
“Revisiting the Strengths and Limitations of Regulatory Contracts in Infrastructure Industries” (2010) J 
Infrastruct Syst 334. 
117 Bakovic et al, “Regulation by Contract, ibid at 10. 
118 Ibid at 16. 
119 Ibid at 16. 
                                                          
[2014]                                MULTI-ACTOR CONTRACTS                                      295 
   
 
actions of the investor and the government. This form of contract contributes to 
fulfilling the ideal of democratic governance. It also takes the regulatory aspect of 
contracting into account and does not advocate a choice between private contracts 
and public regulation. Rather, it straddles the public-private divide and the 
regulation-contract divide. 
 
 
 Although not necessarily advocating the use of contracts as regulation, 
Ayres and Braithwaite in crafting their responsive regulation approach note that it is 
important to include parties to be affected by a regulatory regime.120 Haines puts it 
this way: “… there is a more explicit emphasis on the inclusion in a regulatory 
regime of those most affected by the harm rather than simply those who will be 
affected by the cost of the regulatory regime …. Under the notion of ‘tripartism’ the 
inclusion of community groups, consumers, nursing home residents, workers and 
unions are understood to have a key role to play in enhancing the integrity of any 
regulatory regime in raising standards.”121 
 
 
 Tripartism as a method of regulation has been adopted in practice. 122  
Professor Haines analyzes examples from Australia where local communities are 
formally included in dialogue and some decision-making regarding hazardous 
industries.123 She notes that including local communities in regulatory compliance 
120 See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 8. For a more recent statement on responsive regulation, see 
Braithwaite, “Essence”, supra note 1. The UBC L Rev published an issue on responsive regulation in 
2011. For an introduction to that issue, see Cristie Ford & Natasha Affolder, “Responsive Regulation in 
Context, Circa 2011” (2011) 44 UBC L Rev 463. Other authors have proposed going beyond responsive 
regulation. See e.g. Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, “Really Responsive Regulation” (2008) 71 Mod L Rev 
59. Baldwin & Black note that “to be really responsive, regulators have to be responsive not only to the 
compliance performance of the regulated, but in five further ways: to the firms’ own operating and 
cognitive frameworks (their ‘attitudinal settings’); to the broader institutional environment of the 
regulatory regime; to the different logics of regulatory tools and strategies; to the regime’s own 
performance; and finally to changes in each of these elements,” at 61. 
121 Haines, Paradox of Regulation, supra note 24 at 19. 
122 Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 8 at 56 describe tripartism as follows: “tripartism is a process in which 
relevant public interest groups (PIGs) become the fully fledged third player in the game. As a third player 
in the game, the PIG can directly punish the firm. PIGs can also do much to prevent capture and 
corruption by enforcing … a metanorm – a norm of punishing regulators who fail to punish 
noncompliance.” (Endnotes omitted.) At pages 57-58, they also note: “Tripartism is defined as a 
regulatory policy that fosters the participation of PIGs in the regulatory process in three ways. First, it 
grants the PIG and all its members access to all the information that is available to the regulator. Second, it 
gives the PIG a seat at the negotiating table with the firm and the agency when deals are done. Third, the 
policy grants the PIG the same standing to sue or prosecute under the regulatory statute as the regulator. 
Tripartism means both unlocking to PIGs the smoke-filled rooms where the real business of regulation is 
transacted and allowing the PIG to operate as a private attorney general.” (Endnote omitted.) See also, Ian 
Ayres & John Braithwaite, “Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment” (1991) 16 Law & Soc 
Inq 435 (this article is based mostly on the authors’ chapter on tripartism in Responsive Regulation: 
Transcending the Deregulation Debate, supra note 8). 
123 Fiona Haines, “Vanquishing the Enemy or Civilizing the Neighbour? Controlling the Risks from 
Hazardous Industries” (2009) 18 Soc & Leg Stud 397 [Haines, “Vanquishing the Enemy”]. 
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has “broad appeal”.124 To her, this method has potential with regards to reducing 
environmental damage, to enhancing regulatory compliance, and is also “a 
democratizing shift” that “aligns neatly with a move away from a ‘command and 
control’ orientation of government”. 125 This form of participation is not without 
other effects for as Haines notes, there is a potential for “friction” with 
“institutionalized procedures” that define levels of risk because communities’ 
participation may “unsettle existing definitions of risk and hazard”.126 Haines’ work 
also reveals that the level of community involvement differed from site to site 
suggesting that even if local communities are formally involved in regulatory 
processes, they might not always actively participate. 127  This suggests that 
communities are not intended to replace government regulation and oversight. Their 
involvement is to enhance compliance and accountability. Remarkably, instead of 
antagonizing projects, involving communities permitted communities to shift from 
“‘vanquishing the enemy’, that is, eliminating industry from what was a growing 
residential suburb, to ‘civilizing the neighbour’.”128 People who previously formed 
part of the protest group were now members of a “community liaison committee”.129 
 
 
 Tripartism is only one aspect of responsive regulation. Ayres and 
Braithwaite set out their idea of responsive regulation in their seminal book inter alia 
as follows: 
 
Responsive regulation is not a clearly defined program or a set of 
prescriptions concerning the best way to regulate. On the contrary, the best 
strategy is shown to depend on context, regulatory culture and history. 
Responsiveness is rather an attitude that enables the blossoming of a wide 
variety of regulatory approaches … 
 
Responsiveness, like interactiveness, is not one of those notions such that 
if two people know what responsiveness is, they will come up with the 
same solution for the responsive regulator to implement in a particular 
situation. An attitude of responsiveness does generate different policy 
ideas that do transcend the divide between regulatory and deregulatory 
solutions. But for the responsive regulator, there are no optimal or best 
regulatory solutions, just solutions that respond better than others to the 
124 Ibid at 398. 
125 Ibid. (references omitted). For a comprehensive discussion of the history of and “new generation” 
proposals for environmental regulation (especially in the United States), see Richard B Stewart, “A New 
Generation of Environmental Regulation?” (2001) 29 Capital UL R 21. There are several ideas on newer 
forms of regulation. See for example, Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation 
and Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
126 Haines, “Vanquishing the Enemy”, supra note 123 at 398. 
127 Ibid at 399. 
128 Ibid at 407. 
129 Ibid. 
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plural configurations of support and opposition that exist at a particular 
moment in history.130 
 
Responsive regulation has been severally debated131 and critiqued.132 For Ayres and 
Braithwaite, the ideas included in the responsive regulation model are not necessarily 
“universally applicable” for “responsiveness, after all, implies that there are no 
universal solutions.”133 As Braithwaite himself concedes, responsive regulation was 
developed in developed economies. So even though the responsive regulation 
approach acknowledges that there are no universal solutions, in developing 
regulatory frameworks, it is important to heed the warning that there are problems 
“associated with the strong tendency to transfer to Third World countries ‘best 
practice’ models of regulation rooted in the different economic, social and political 
conditions of developed countries.”134 In this regard, Braithwaite notes that the much 
debated idea of “responsive regulation”135 that he developed with Ian Ayres “is an 
approach designed in developed economies” and “[m]ost of the critiques of it are 
also framed within the context of developed economies.” 136  The success of 
tripartism, one of the component parts of responsive regulation, is also “culturally, 
institutionally, and historically contingent.”137 Multi-actor contracts, as a framework, 
are not envisioned as culturally or institutionally contingent. Rather, the contents of 
each contract may be context specific. 
 
 
 One of the differences between developed and Third World countries that 
Braithwaite takes on in his work considering the adoption of responsive regulation in 
Third World countries is that Third World countries work with the constraint of 
having less regulatory capacity compared to developed countries.138 For Braithwaite, 
this challenge makes responsive regulation potentially apposite for Third World 
130 Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 8 at 5. 
131 See for example, the articles in (2011) 44 UBC L Rev. 
132 See for example, Surya Deva, Regulating Corporate Human Rights Violations: Humanizing Business 
(London; New York: Routledge, 2012), especially, chapter 7 titled: “The Integrated Theory of Regulation: 
A Critical Response to ‘Responsive Regulation’”. Highlighting aspects of responsive regulation like the 
“progressive enforcement pyramid” and “enforced self-regulation”, Deva argues that (aspects of) 
responsive regulation is not well suited to the regulation of corporate human rights abuses, arguing instead 
for an “integrated theory of regulation.” 
133 Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 8 at 5. 
134 Martin Minogue &Ledivina Carino, “Introduction: Regulatory Governance in Developing Countries” 
in Martin Minogue & Ledivina Carino eds, Regulatory Governance in Developing Countries 
(Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, Mass: Edward Elgar, 2006) 3 at 6. 
135 Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 8.  
136 John Braithwaite, “Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies” (2006) 34 World Dev884 
[Braithwaite, “Developing Economies”]. 
137 Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 8 at 97.  
138 Braithwaite, “Developing Economies”, supra note 136 at 884. 
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countries because it “mobilizes cheaper forms of social control than state command 
and control.”139 Hence the idea of “networked governance” appears to be one that is 
considered workable in Third World countries. 140  While networked governance 
appears attractive, commentators like Professor Affolder, in her discussion of the 
regulation of large projects, have cautioned against overstating the “degree of 
cooperation” among the relevant actors. 141 Even though networks are envisioned 
here more as the participation of governments (the regulator), investors (the 
regulated), and the affected communities (rather than non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs)), Professor Affolder’s caution must not be taken lightly. 142 
The argument here proceeds on the assumption that the danger of the failures of 
networks is reduced where instead of relying on NGOs to provide the external voice, 
the impacted communities are directly involved in contract processes. This does not 
however, suggest that divergences of opinion cannot exist between the regulator, the 
regulated, and the impacted communities.  
 
 
 The regulation of gas flaring in Nigeria provides a case in point. The 
government has set levels of acceptable gas flaring. Where these levels are exceeded, 
the industry actors in violation of the regulation are penalized with a fine. 143  
Impacted communities disagree with the level of gas flaring and the regulatory 
response to exceeding these levels. As a result, an action144 was initiated where it 
was argued inter alia that provisions of the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act145 and 
139 Ibid. Braithwaite notes that “[p]recisely because responsive regulation deals with the fact that no 
government has the capacity to enforce all laws, it is useful for thinking about regulation in developing 
countries with weak enforcement capabilities,” at 888.  
140 Ibid at 890. 
141 Natasha Affolder, “Why Study Large Projects?: Environmental Regulation’s Neglected Frontier” 
(2011) 44 UBC L Rev 521 at 531. She notes that “NGOs each have their own agendas in large project 
debates, and the single-issue focus of some of these groups may function to undermine the partnership 
potential of these networks ... ““constellations” of regulatory actors that appear as networks may not 
actually operate as networks. Their manifestation may reflect only an ephemeral convergence of interests. 
The points of disagreement between the state and the regulator and the non-state network partner may be 
so acute that the network functions to undermine the functioning of the regulatory pyramid rather than to 
enhance it.” (Footnotes omitted.) 
142 For an aspect of governance that has been termed nodal governance, see Scott Burris, Peter Drahos & 
Clifford Shearing, “Nodal Governance” (2005) 30 Aust J Leg Phil 30 [Burris et al, “Nodal Governance”]; 
Peter Drahos, “Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance Approach” (2004) 
77 Temp L Rev 401. In “Nodal Governance” Burris et al reject the notion that governance is restricted to 
the state and its subdivisions. As the authors demonstrate, nodal governance, which is not always 
accountable, and which does not always provide positive spaces for all people, is “an elaboration of 
contemporary network theory that explains how a variety of actors operating within social systems interact 
along networks to govern the systems they inhabit.” See Burris et al, “Nodal Governance” at 33. 
143 For a discussion of gas flaring in Nigeria, see Odumosu, “Gas Flaring”, supra note 93. 
144 Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd. & Ors. (2005) AHRLR 151 (NgHC 
2005) [Gbemre]. 
145 Cap A25 Vol 1, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
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Associated Gas Re-Injection (Continued Flaring of Gas) Regulations are 
inconsistent with the right to life enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution and violate 
provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and 
Enforcement) Act. 146  This case involved the management of competing goals – 
attracting and retaining foreign investment, and maintaining human health and the 
ecological integrity of the environment.  
 
 
 There is a divergence of opinion between the regulator, the regulated, and 
the impacted communities on gas flaring issues, which the proposed PIB seeks to 
address by imposing significant fines for gas flaring. Investors argue that the 
production of Nigeria’s oil involves the production of associated gas for which there 
are insufficient utilization outlets, hence the need for gas flaring.147 In order to retain 
investment in oil and gas, the Government has not prohibited flaring. Rather it 
imposes fines for gas flaring that exceed specified levels. The local communities that 
are negatively impacted by gas flaring prefer to not have such activities continue. 
One of the options that local communities have is to file an action, which they did in 
Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd. & Ors.148 
 
 
 A healthy level of disagreement between government and community 
groups may help put the challenges of regulation in perspective. It may also position 
the so-called rationalism of government and the so-called utopianism of community 
groups such that their disagreements would allow for dialogue that fosters 
cooperation. A multi-actor contract could, for example, address proposed relocations 
of local communities from their land. Communities could decide whether and on 
what terms they will be relocated including compensation for such relocation. Rather 
than adopt a process where governments and industry decide peoples’ relocation in 
arrangements to which communities are not privy, multi-actor contracts would 
facilitate local communities’ participation at the negotiation stages, as well as at the 
dispute resolution stages if necessary. Such a contract would serve the purpose of 
accommodating competing goals. It would also add oversight by the local 
communities that are party to the contract, as they could insist that government 
should enforce the contract or regulations as prescribed under the contract. Having 
these communities at the negotiating table might enable all the actors to achieve 
greater balance amongst competing goals. 
 
 
 Networked governance also suggests a shift from the “regulatory state” to 
the “regulatory society”.149 Yet in the words of Ayres and Braithwaite, responsive 
146 Cap A9 Vol 1, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
147 See Odumosu, “Gas Flaring”, supra note 93. 
148 Gbemre, supra note 144. 
149 Braithwaite, “Developing Economies”, supra note 136 at 890. 
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regulation requires more than commitment from the state; it requires a strong state. 
Ayres and Braithwaite argue for “an interventionist state that redistributes power 
through enforcing participating rights for powerless groups and providing resources 
for them.”150 The state is a “social democratic state” that “actively redistributes both 
the wealth that enables market power and the participation rights that enable 
democratic power.”151 This is the point at which responsive regulation as couched by 
Ayres and Braithwaite hits an obstacle with commitments made under international 
foreign investment law. Interventionism and redistribution could easily offend the 
provisions of investment treaties to which states have committed themselves. 
However, where tripartism or variations of the notion is viewed as part of the 
democratic process, resistance from the forces of international investment law may 
be reduced. Indeed, international law itself may be changed. For, tripartism is “a 
route to a more participatory democracy, a more genuine democracy that does not 
make unrealistic demands of mass participation in all institutional arenas.”152 
 
 
 Although it is not the primary goal of multi-actor contracts, adopting these 
tripartite contracts to manage competing goals could serve partly as a response to the 
limitations of government in regulation. It could specifically respond to 
government’s regulatory limitations and fill gaps in realization that the government 
may be unable to do everything or may sometimes, for political or other reasons, be 
unwilling to do certain things. As Ayres and Braithwaite note, tripartism could be a 
response to regulatory capture, 153 which sometimes is a symptom of regulatory 
failure. 
 
 
 Yet, tripartism does not escape concerns of workability in practice. Cristie 
Ford expresses the following opinion: 
 
[I]njecting a meaningfully independent perspective into regulation, by way 
of tripartism, may be more challenging in practice than is sometimes 
realized. Regulators operate within a relatively narrow, insulated, and 
expertise-based band of human experience, characterized by relationships 
with sophisticated repeat players. In spite of their public-regarding 
mandate they may be cognitively predisposed against “outsiders” who 
either lack facility with the dominant jargon, or who take issue with 
assumptions that no one in the industry takes issue with. They are also 
150 Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 8 at 18. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 8 at 83. The authors continue, noting that they “do not envision a 
tripartism where most beneficiaries of regulation participate in PIGs, where most who do participate in 
PIGs will be interested enough to process the information made available to them, where the incumbency 
of PIG representatives is frequently contested … The vision of democracy is of extended periods of 
peaceful apathy punctuated by infrequent ringing of alarm bells occasioning gushes of grassroots 
participation, and even infrequent purges,” at 84. 
153 Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 8 at 54. 
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more likely to share social, education, or experiential ties with industry 
actors than with others. Even well-informed activist shareholders may not 
receive the same measure of automatic regulatory respect. In short, it may 
be that a far greater push is required to force participation into regulatory 
conversations than is sometimes imagined by advocates and scholars of 
flexible regulation.154 
 
The question remains though whether host and other communities impacted by 
extractive industries are “outsiders”. While they may be outsiders to the regulatory 
process in situations where regulation only admits the regulator and the regulated, 
they are not outsiders to the impacts of the regulatory regime. In addition, the multi-
actor approach does not substitute local communities for government regulators. 
Rather, it creates an enforceable oversight structure that could enhance regulation 
where the relevant contracts include regulatory or quasi-regulatory provisions. If 
standards are not complied with, communities could adopt dispute settlement 
procedures provided for under the contracts. But the question of the party who would 
bear the costs of such dispute settlement proceedings remains.  
 
 
 Examples of existing contractual models that could provide some guidance 
include Environmental agreements; and Impact and Benefits Agreements, the Global 
Memorandum of Understanding,155 and other Community Development Agreements 
(CDAs).156 Environmental agreements are particularly apposite for this discussion. 
Depending on how they are constructed, environmental agreements can vary in their 
composition of parties, their purposes, and their extent of legal and regulatory 
influence. In a survey of environmental agreements in the United States, Japan, and 
Germany, Rehbinder notes that some environmental agreements in Japan involve 
direct, formal participation from the local community.157 Rehbinder’s analysis of the 
reasons for concluding these environmental agreements is instructive. The reasons 
range from higher environmental standards on the parts of local governments and 
communities, to adjusting regulation to specific cases. For industry, these agreements 
are a “confidence-building strategy” to create relationships that can be leveraged in 
154 Cristie Ford, “Macro- and Micro-Level Effects on Responsive Financial Regulation” (2011) 44 UBC L 
Rev 589 at 614-615. 
155 The Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMOU) is used in Nigeria. See Odumosu-Ayanu, “Multi-
Actor Investment Agreement Framework”, supra note 9. 
156 Community Development Agreements (CDAs) are not mandated by law in all countries. For example, 
South African regulation does not mandate CDAs although there is a framework in place for addressing 
community development issues. See Mining Community Development Agreements – Practical 
Experiences and Field Studies (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2010) 20-21. Sections 116 &117 of the 
Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act, (Nigeria), No 20 of 2007 require the conclusion of CDAs. 
157 Eckard Rehbinder, “Ecological Contracts: Agreements between Polluters and Local Communities” in 
Gunther Teubner, Lindsay Farmer &Declan Murphy eds, Environmental Law and Ecological 
Responsibility: The Concept and Practice of Ecological Self-Organization (John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 
1994) 147 at 152. 
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future disagreements that concern other matters. 158  Also for industry, these 
agreements are a form of corporate social responsibility.159 In Japan, there is high 
“political acceptance” of these environmental agreements although the reasons vary 
for why each stakeholder adopts them.160 
 
 
 Environmental agreements concluded between industry actors and local 
communities exist in several countries. 161  Although the prevailing approach to 
environmental contracts has been the government regulator-industry model, scholars 
have noted the utility of engaging local communities. Without necessarily taking the 
leap to contracts that involve local communities, Orts and Deketelaere note that: 
 
[T]he emerging importance of local environmental contracting … suggests 
the need for vigorous development and involvement of local 
environmental and community organizations. … From an environmentalist 
perspective, this development may be positive in encouraging more people 
to become active in projects that encourage the appreciation of a sense of 
“place” within the natural environment. Moreover, some of the more 
intransigent kinds of environmental problems may demand a more local 
approach. Without local participation of community groups and local 
citizens, for example, it is difficult to see how problems such as nonpoint 
source water pollution can be addressed.162 
 
 
 Canada has adopted different formats of environmental agreements. Some 
Aboriginal communities are party to implementation protocols to main 
environmental agreements while others are party to the main agreements. The Ekati 
mine provides an implementation protocol example. 163  Aboriginal communities 
participated in negotiation of the environmental agreement for the Ekati mine.164 
However, they were not party to the eventual agreement concluded between the 
Government of Canada; the Government of the Northwest Territories, where the 
158 Ibid at 153-154. 
159 Ibid at 154. 
160 Ibid at 155. 
161 As Affolder notes, environmental contracts may be concluded “between companies and regulators, 
companies and community groups, or companies and indigenous peoples.” Affolder, “Environmental 
Contracting”, supra note 103 at 156. 
162 Eric W Orts & Kurt Deketelaere, “Introduction: Environmental Contracts and Regulatory Innovation” 
in Deketelaere & Orts, supra note 105,  at 33-34. 
163 See Canadian Institute of Resources Law, Independent Review of the BHP Diamond Mine Process (30 
June 1997) 19-20, online: <http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ/STAGING/texte-
text/bhp_1100100036029_eng.pdf>. 
164 Affolder, “Environmental Contracting”, supra note 103 at 156. 
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Ekati mine is located; and BHP Diamonds Inc., the project proponent.165 In later 
instances, Aboriginal communities in Canada have participated as parties to 
environmental agreements.166 For example, local communities are party to the main 
environmental agreements in the De Beers Canada Mining Inc. Snap Lake Diamond 
Project’s environmental agreement167 and the Diavik Mine Project’s environmental 
agreement.168  
 
 
 Even before the more recent Ekati, Snap Lake, and Diavik projects, there 
were examples of contract negotiations that involved local communities. Meinhard 
Doelle describes the circumstances surrounding the Dona Lake project, which led to 
series of agreements, some involving local communities, in the early 1990s. 169  
Relying on Thompson and Reuggeberg,170 Doelle identified inter alia the need for “a 
small number of parties with well-defined interests” in these contract negotiations.171 
He notes that the “process is perhaps best saved for instances where there is a special 
need for cooperation, where the parties are easily identifiable and limited in number, 
and where there is a reasonable expectation that agreement can be reached and that 
the process will not be used as a stalling tactic by any of the parties.”172 According to 
Doelle, the Dona Lake project was the first attempt to put Barton et al’s173 ideas into 
practice in Canada.174 In the Dona Lake example, there was a main agreement that 
was concluded between Dome Exploration (Canada) Ltd. (now Placer Dome), the 
165 Ibid. See Environmental Agreement dated as of January 6, 1997 between Her Majesty the Queen in 
Right of Canada and the Government of the Northwest Territories and BHP Diamonds Inc., online: 
Independent Environmental Monitoring Agency 
<http://www.monitoringagency.net/ResourceCentre/EnvironmentalAgreement/tabid/87/Default.aspx>. 
166 Affolder, “Environmental Contracting”, supra note 103 at 169. 
167 Environmental Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada and the Government of 
the Northwest Territories and De Beers Canada Mining Inc. and Dogrib Treaty 11 Council and Lutsel 
K’E Dene Band and Yellowknives Dene First Nation and North Slave Métis Alliance (2004), online: Snap 
Lake Environmental Monitoring Agency <http://www.slema.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/De-Beers-
Final-Environmental-Agreement-PDF1.pdf>. 
168 Environmental Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada and the Government of 
the Northwest Territories and Diavik Diamond Mines Inc. and Dogrib Treaty 11 Council and Lutsel K’E 
Dene Band and Yellowknives Dene First Nation and North Slave Métis Alliance and Kitikmeot Inuit 
Association (8 March 2000), online: Environmental Monitoring Advisory Board 
<http://www.emab.ca/Portals/0/Documents/diavik_enviro_agree.pdf>. 
169 Meinhard Doelle, “Regulating the Environment by Mediation and Contract Negotiation: A Case Study 
of the Dona Lake Agreement” 2 J. Ent’l L & Prac 189. 
170 Thompson & Rueggeberg, supra note 75. 
171 Doelle, supra note 169 at 191. 
172 Ibid at 212. 
173 Barton et al, supra note 74. 
174 Doelle, supra note 169 at 193. 
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local communities, the Federal Government and the Government of Ontario, and 
other sub-agreements.175  
 
 
 Doelle identifies some of the challenges with these agreements including 
the absence of many of the communities’ initial expectations, and “almost non-
existent…legally significant commitments in the main agreement.”176 Writing many 
years later, Fidler and Hitch note that one of the agreements, between the Osnaburg 
Nation and Dome Exploration, later failed.177 According to Fidler and Hitch, the 
“failure was correlated with the paternalistic approach the proponent took, with 
decision making solely in the hands of industry and little consultation with the 
Osnaburg Nation.” 178 They contrast this, however, with more recent agreements, 
which in their view include provisions that better represent the position of local 
communities.179  
 
 
 Essentially, including local communities that are directly impacted in 
decision-making through enforceable contracts may not address all the challenges 
that the multiple actors face. The process must allow for robust interaction to take 
place in order to negotiate and incorporate the interests and perspectives of the 
relevant actors. 
 
 
 In addition to environmental agreements that include local communities as 
parties, CDAs typically involve local community participation. CDAs, which are not 
without significant limitations, are not quintessential regulatory instruments but they 
provide a platform for the extension of the investor-community contract model to the 
area of regulation. 180 The intention is not to suggest a community development 
contract perspective, but to show through references to these agreements that 
175 Ibid at 197-198. 
176 Ibid at 198. 
177 Courtney Fidler & Michael Hitch, “Impact and Benefit Agreements: A Contentious Issue for 
Environmental and Aboriginal Justice” (2007) 35 Environments J49 at 61. 
178 Ibid at 62. 
179 Ibid at 60-61. 
180 Literature on Canadian Impact and Benefit Agreements, a type of CDAs, suggest that the focus of these 
instruments is mainly benefits provision including training, employment and business opportunities. They 
also demonstrate that industry-community agreements already exist. See Irene Sosa & Karyn Keenan, 
“Impact Benefit Agreements between Aboriginal Communities and Mining Companies: Their Use in 
Canada” (Canadian Environmental Law Association, 2001); Janet Keeping, “The Legal and Constitutional 
Basis for Benefits Agreements: A Summary” (1999-2000) 25 Northern Perspectives; Sandra Gogal, 
Richard Riegert & JoAnn Jamieson, “Aboriginal Impact and Benefit Agreements: Practical 
Considerations” (2005) 43 Alb L Rev 129; Ken J. Caine & Naomi Krogman, “Powerful or Just Plain 
Power-Full?: A Power Analysis of Impact and Benefits Agreements in Canada’s North” (2010) 23 Organ 
& Environ 76. 
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investor-community agreements already exist in some areas. A Model Mine 
Development Agreement sponsored inter alia by the International Bar Association 
Section on Energy, Environment, Natural Resources and Infrastructure Law includes 
a clause that mandates CDAs.181 One purpose of the CDA listed in the Model Mine 
Development Agreement is to “address environmental, social, and economic 
conditions during mining and after mine closure …”. 182  Such clauses could be 
apposite for developing effective regulatory frameworks based on community 
involvement. Article 27.2 of the Model Agreement also provides a forum for the 
settlement of disputes.183 
 
 
 Contracts that involve local communities as active parties in aspects of 
decision-making concerning investment activities exist in various forms. These 
contracts are formed in recognition of the position that scholars have advanced on 
the need for participation from local communities in the extractive industries. 
Government policies and laws also support this view. Hence, there is a strong basis 
for advocating for a multi-actor contract perspective that incorporates actors who are 
directly relevant. What this perspective contributes that many of the existing 
contracts do not share is that all three relevant actors are directly involved as part of 
a single contract. In addition, unlike many regulatory contracts between investors 
and regulators, these contracts are meant to have enforceable provisions. Also, and 
importantly, they are not conceived as instruments that replace government 
regulation, for communities are likely to lack the expertise to regulate these complex 
competing goals. Rather, they serve as democratic modes of governance that have 
the potential to contribute to the effective management of competing goals and 
enhance regulation given that both the regulator and the regulated have entered into 
an enforceable contract with the beneficiary for inter alia the management of 
competing goals. 
 
 
 The multi-actor contract perspective has the potential to be particularly 
advantageous in unstable economic situations because it allows oversight at times 
when governments might choose to focus on economic stability to the exclusion of 
other important issues. It is based on the recognition of communities’ agency; it 
partly responds to governments’ regulatory challenges and failures; and, in the 
specific context of investment regulation, it addresses limitations in policy space 
generated through commitments made in international investment law. In addition, 
communities’ involvement would foster monitoring and encourage reporting by 
181 Model Mine Development Agreement (MMDA 1.0) 4 April 2011, online Model Mining Development 
Agreement Project: <http://www.mmdaproject.org/presentations/MMDA1_0_110404Bookletv3.pdf>. 
182 Ibid at Article 22.1(c). 
183 It states as follows: “A natural citizen of the State who has a claim or dispute regarding the Project may 
submit such claim or dispute for resolution under Applicable Law, or under an applicable customary law 
dispute resolution mechanism recognized under Applicable Law. The Company consents to the 
jurisdiction of local institutions for these purposes.” 
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industry and regulatory agencies. Since communities are often in close proximity to 
natural resource projects, they are well placed to file reports of discrepancies with 
the regulator as well as monitor the effectiveness of the regulators and hold them 
accountable. And as Haines notes, instead of seeing investors as the “enemy” to be 
‘vanquished’, local community-involved arrangements have the potential to create 
amicable relationships that have eluded many extractive industry projects.184 Multi-
actor contracts do not however preclude a situation where communities may refuse 
to contractually engage with industry actors who perpetrate egregious activities.  
 
 
 ii. Multi-Actor Contracts and Investment Regulation: Issues for Further 
 Research 
 
It has been argued severally that in order “to promote economic and social welfare” 
state regulation “needs to be both effective and efficient.”185 If regulation needs to be 
both effective and efficient, the question is whether multi-actor contracts are able to 
contribute to these goals. Regulation is not cheap. Effective regulation comes at a 
financial cost for governments and these costs take on a significant dimension when 
one considers the needs of some less economically-established countries. 
 
 
 The discussion here raises several issues with regards to the effectiveness 
and feasibility of involving local communities in decision-making on foreign 
investment projects through binding contracts. Further research will determine the 
specific contents of these contracts and their specific contributions to regulation. It 
suffices here to outline some of the issues for further research and preliminary 
responses to these issues. 
 
 
 First, involving citizens in direct participation raises the concern of placing 
burdens on citizens, for example, with regard to negotiating or enforcing contracts 
through judicial action where necessary. In such an instance, existing environmental 
and other similar agreements may provide some guidance on the level of 
responsibility placed on citizens and the responsiveness of communities to these 
responsibilities. The internal structures of each local community as well as the 
decision-making processes that these communities adopt are also critical issues that 
require dedicated attention. One cannot overemphasize the “considerable obstacles to 
184 Haines, “Vanquishing the Enemy”, supra note 123. 
185 Colin Kirkpatrick & David Parker, “Regulatory Impact Assessment and Regulatory Governance in 
Developing Countries” (2004) 24 Pub Admin & Dev 333 at 334 (Emphasis in original). The authors 
continue: “Effective in the sense of achieving its planned goals and efficient in the sense of achieving 
these goals at least cost, in terms of government administration costs and the costs imposed on the 
economy in terms of complying with regulations.” 
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effective participation” that local communities face.186 Overcoming these obstacles 
in the context of the multi-actor contracts is a major issue for further research.  
 
 
 Second, some might express concern that the local communities do not have 
the expertise to regulate the day-to-day activities of business. The approach 
discussed here does not envisage local communities undertaking such a role. 
Regulators would retain their mandates and would continue to be charged with the 
ultimate responsibility of regulation. What multi-actor contracts add to regulation is 
to permit persons affected by regulation to serve as overseers of broad picture issues, 
for example, the adequate balancing of competing economic benefits and other 
environmental and social goals. This way, they serve to oversee both investors and 
government. While local communities may not have the expertise to regulate 
business or environmental issues, multi-actor contracts would give them the 
opportunity to demand that contract terms should be fulfilled. For example, local 
communities are well placed to spot gas flares, oil spills, dumping of toxic waste and 
so on. Where actions of this nature occur, they could respond appropriately based on 
the terms of their contracts. 
 
 
 Third, given the contractual nature of the arrangement, to what extent are 
parties allowed not only to breach contracts but to terminate contracts and bring an 
end to contractual relationships? Responses to this question may depend on the terms 
of the parties’ contracts. The contracts may include terms that provide for 
termination, for example, for egregious and persistent breach of contract. However, 
even if the contracts are terminated, it does not suggest that regulation will come to 
an end. The legislative regime for regulation will continue unabated in this case.187 
The response may also depend on the domestic laws applicable to contracts in each 
jurisdiction. Under the common law applicable in Canada for example, parties to 
contracts may breach the terms of their agreements with consequences determined by 
the parties or by the judiciary.188 A contract may also be terminated where the breach 
goes to the root of the contract and the party not in breach elects to disaffirm the 
contract.189 The extent to which these general contract rules would affect contractual 
arrangements to facilitate the balancing of competing aims depends on the contents 
of the contracts as well as the laws of the relevant jurisdiction. 
186 Marcus B Lane & Tony Corbett, “The Tyranny of Localism: Indigenous Participation in Community-
based Environmental Management” (2005) 7 J Environ Pol Plan 141 at 155. 
187 Barton et al, supra note 74 at 28-29, 36 advocate retaining a permit system under statute to which 
parties may refer in cases where they are unable to reach a (voluntary) agreement. The permit system may 
also provide a system to which the parties may revert in cases where their contracts are terminated for 
persistent breach or other reasons. 
188 On contract termination in Common Law Canada, see generally, John D McCamus, The Law of 
Contracts (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2005); Bruce MacDougall, Introduction to Contracts, 2nd ed, 
(Toronto: Lexis Nexis Canada Inc, 2012). 
189 See McCamus, ibid at 641-43; MacDougall, ibid. at 137-19, 301. 
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 Fourth, concerns about the rigidity of regulatory regimes do not necessarily 
affect the multi-actor contract framework. Concerns that these contracts may not be 
amenable to diverse regulatory scenarios is limited and almost non-existent. The 
very essence of a flexible approach to regulation is to adopt perspectives that work 
for any particular situation. This approach is amenable to balancing competing goals 
of different types. To the extent that some technical details or other circumstances 
not appropriate for this approach are confronted, the approach would not be adopted. 
 
 
 Fifth, concerns that contracts of this nature may not be in the wider public 
interest other than in the interest of the immediate stakeholders could also be raised. 
As noted earlier, it is necessary to continue to operate statutory schemes with 
innovative regulatory approaches separate from the multi-actor contracts. As a result, 
regulators remain under a mandate to appropriately consider the broader public 
interest. The multi-actor contracts would provide a layer of protection for 
communities impacted directly in a manner that the broader public is not. As 
discussed in other works that provide details of the multi-actor approach, there would 
be a requirement for contract registration with an institution that could ensure that 
the broader public continues to enjoy an adequate level of regulatory protection.190 
 
 
 Sixth, one of the potential challenges of incorporating local communities in 
contract negotiation is that these communities will negotiate with governments and 
industry actors that have sophisticated contract negotiation teams. Governments and 
industry actors have significant resources and expertise that they draw from in 
contract negotiation. Given that communities are not currently involved in many of 
these types of contract negotiation, they would not initially possess the same level of 
expertise as the other parties. Hence there is need for further research on how these 
communities may garner the necessary resources and expertise. Potential options 
include government funding for local communities to hire negotiating teams and the 
provision of resources for community mobilization and meetings to determine the 
views that diverse members of communities may hold. In addition, it is necessary to 
situate these contracts within an external framework, perhaps a regional organization 
or an independent domestic body that has the responsibility to ensure that negotiation 
is free and fair. Transparency in negotiation would also facilitate a free and fair 
process. It is also necessary to guard against the capture of local communities 
throughout the process and to appropriately navigate the sometimes inevitable 
cultural and other differences in order to better manage disagreements and foster 
amicable relationships. These are all issues that require further research. 
 
 
 Finally, and perhaps, most importantly, some communities may completely 
reject proposals for extraction of natural resources from their communities. Current 
legal responses depend on the status of local communities – indigenous or non-
190 Odumosu-Ayanu, “Multi-Actor Investment Agreement Framework”, supra note 9. 
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indigenous.191 For indigenous communities, the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognizes indigenous communities’ rights to free, 
prior and informed consent (FPIC).192 The extent to which the national governments 
of countries have adopted the FPIC principle varies from country to country. 193 
Canada for the most part has only proceeded with recognition of the duty to 
consult.194 Many African countries, for their part, resist recognizing some groups’ 
claims of indigenous status.195 Irrespective of state reluctance to fully embrace FPIC, 
the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya, has noted 
that “indigenous individuals and peoples have the right to oppose and actively 
express opposition to extractive projects…”196 In addition, he notes that “[s]tates 
should not insist, or allow companies to insist, that indigenous peoples engage in 
consultations about proposed extractive projects to which they have clearly 
expressed opposition.”197  
 
 
 A complete discussion of FPIC is beyond the scope of this article. 
Nevertheless, a brief response is apposite. There is no use for contracts in the face of 
complete local community opposition if at the very foundation of the contract 
structure lays the principle that all the parties should be able to express their views 
and have the other stakeholders fully consider those views. Where a community 
191 On indigenous people and international law, see generally, S James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law, 2nd ed (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); James (Sa’ke’j) 
Youngblood Henderson, Indigenous Diplomacy and the Rights of Peoples: Achieving UN Recognition 
(Saskatoon: Purich, 2008); Steven Curry, Indigenous Sovereignty and the Democratic Project (Aldershot, 
UK: Ashgate, 2004); James Anaya, “Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in Relation to Decisions 
about Natural Resource Extraction: The More Fundamental Issue of what Rights Indigenous People have 
in Lands and Resources” (2005) 22 Ariz J Int’l & Comp L 7. 
192 Article 32(2) of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples A/RES/61/295, 13 
September  2007, states: “States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent 
prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in 
connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.” Article 
19 also states: “States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent 
before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them.”  
193 On FPIC, see generally, David Szablowski, “Operationalizing Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in the 
Extractive Industry Sector?: Examining the Challenges of a Negotiated Model of Justice” (2010) 30 Can J 
Devp Stud 111. 
194 See generally, Dwight G. Newman, The Duty to Consult: New Relationships with Aboriginal Peoples 
(Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2009). 
195 Odumosu-Ayanu, “Oil and Gas Decision-Making”, supra note 11. 
196 James Anaya, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Extractive 
Industries and Indigenous Peoples” (1 July 2013), UN General Assembly, A/HRC/24/41 at para 19. 
197 Anaya, ibid at para 25. Anaya continues: “The Declaration and various other international sources of 
authority, along with practical considerations, lead to a general rule that extractive activities should not 
take place within the territories of indigenous peoples without their free, prior and informed consent,” at 
para 27.  
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expresses fundamental disagreement with an extractive project, contract negotiation 
is not the answer. Multi-actor contracts may be conceived as agreements that 
incorporate the parties’ views and interests where they at least agree that a project 
may proceed but need to negotiate the terms under which the project is executed. If 
the foundational legal framework for multi-actor contracts adopted in any given 
jurisdiction requires that multi-actor contracts must be concluded before an 
extractive project can be undertaken, the duty to consult communities which is 
recognized in some jurisdictions, is transformed to the right to consent before 
projects commence. The ramifications and impacts of the multi-actor contracts are 
ultimately context-specific. 
 
 
E. Conclusion: Potential Contributions of the Multi-Actor Framework to 
Investment Regulation 
 
Ultimately, this article adopts a modest and measured view of the potential 
contributions of multi-actor contracts as primary regulatory instruments. In essence, 
while they may serve regulatory roles, they are not conceived primarily as regulatory 
instruments. This view may evolve as further research is conducted on the subject 
and if there is any practice to explore the concrete contributions of the multi-actor 
contract mechanism. Nevertheless, some potential contributions of this approach to 
effective regulation of foreign investment and the management of competing goals 
are outlined below. 
 
 
 First, multi-actor contracts are viewed as primarily applicable in extractive 
industries and other tangible projects that have a close connection with host and 
impacted local communities. These industries have the potential to implicate 
multiple goals that have different impacts on different stakeholders. As discussed, 
there is a strong economic goal with foreign investment in the extractive industries as 
well as a major risk that these projects will have significant impacts on the 
environment and the lives of local communities. In order to achieve the gains of 
extractive industry projects, host communities are often displaced and sometimes not 
adequately compensated or relocated to comparable locations as promised. 198 A 
properly and carefully negotiated multi-actor contract would account for diverse 
interests and ensure that these communities have recourse under a contract 
framework that concretely recognizes their rights. 
 
 
 Second, actors tend to carefully protect issues that are important to them. In 
protecting their interests, they act as quasi-regulators on the actions of others. For 
example, even though we tend to think of governments as regulators of FDI, they 
often are also regulated to the extent that foreign investors hold governments 
198 See generally, UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2007: Transnational Corporations, Extractive 
Industries and Development (New York; Geneva: United Nations, 2007) 150. 
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accountable by insisting that they comply with a prescribed legal agenda. In cases 
where governments fail to effectively enforce regulation, or in order to achieve 
robust regulatory purposes, having directly involved stakeholders taking an active 
part in extractive industry decision-making through multi-actor contracts would 
prompt better regulatory initiatives and enforcement. 
 
 
 Third, multi-actor contracts could directly serve as regulatory instruments. 
This would depend on the context and contents of each contract. In addition, the 
clauses in such contracts would need to be situated within broader statutory 
frameworks for effective legal foundations. However, the relevant actors must 
exercise some caution. There is a need for research on whether and how multi-actor 
contracts can serve as regulatory instruments as some regulatory contracts between 
governments and industry already do. Some of these government-investor regulatory 
contracts have suffered from shortcomings, and some reservations include the 
voluntary nature of these regulatory contracts and the absence of concrete legislative 
background. 199  In order to conclude multi-actor contracts that serve directly as 
regulatory instruments, further research is necessary. 
 
 
 Recent events and developments often trigger the adoption of new 
regulatory responses and sometimes, new regulatory approaches. This article has 
examined the potential contributions of multi-actor contracts to the management of 
competing goals in foreign investment regulation. In order to arrive at more definite 
conclusions, there is a need for praxis on this subject. Barton et al200 suggested the 
industry-government regulatory contract for Canada and it was tested in practice. As 
well, the multi-actor approach requires further academic research as well as practical 
study. In spite of the limitations that international law on foreign investment 
sometimes places on foreign investment regulation, there is a need to share 
“instructive stories” in order to improve regulation. The multi-actor contract 
framework is an example of an approach with the potential to generate “instructive 
stories” that can improve not only regulation but also foster more amicable 
relationships in the foreign investment regime.201 
 
 
199 See generally, Deketelaere & Orts, supra note 105. 
200 Barton et al, supra note 74. 
201 Braithwaite, “Essence”, supra note 1 at 520. 
                                                          
